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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND INTRAMURAL HOSPITAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS: THE TEXAS ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES ACT

THADDEUS MASON POPE*
ABSTRACT
Increasingly, clinicians and commentators have been calling for the
establishment of special adjudicatory dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve
intractable medical futility disputes. As a leading model to follow,
policymakers both around the United States and around the world have been
looking to the conflict resolution provisions in the 1999 Texas Advance
Directives Act (TADA).
In this article, I provide a complete and thorough review of the purpose,
history, and operation of TADA. I conclude that TADA is a commendable
attempt to balance the competing goals of efficiency and fairness in the
resolution of these time-sensitive, life-and-death conflicts. But TADA is too
lopsided. It is far more efficient than it is fair. TADA should be amended to
better comport with fundamental notions of procedural due process.

* Director of the Health Law Institute and Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law;
Adjunct Professor, Australian Centre for Health Law Research, Queensland University of
Technology; Adjunct Associate Professor, Albany Medical College; Visiting Professor of
Medical Jurisprudence, Saint Georges University. For valuable feedback, I thank Tom Mayo;
QUT reviewers; and participants at the 28th Annual Saint Louis University Health Law
Symposium (April 2016), the Loyola-DePaul Chicago Health Law Colloquium (Mar. 2015), the
Quinnipiac-Yale Dispute Resolution Workshop (Feb. 2015), and an NYU Langone public lecture
(Feb. 2015). This is a significantly expanded and updated version of an article prepared for an
Australian conference and originally published in 16 QLD. U. TECH. L.R. 22–53 (2016).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflicts over the appropriateness of continuing life-sustaining medical
treatment (LSMT) at the end of life are disturbingly common. 1 Dominant
among these conflicts are “medical futility disputes.” In this type of end-of-life
treatment conflict, intensive care unit (ICU) clinicians determine that it is
medically and ethically appropriate to stop LSMT and focus on comfort
measures only. But the patient’s surrogate decision maker will not consent to
that treatment plan. Because LSMT can (or might be able to) sustain at least
the patient’s biological life, the surrogate wants it continued.
Fortunately, most of these medical futility disputes can be resolved through
informal consensus-building approaches. 2 Eventually, with intensive
communication, negotiation, and mediation, the parties reach agreement.
Nevertheless, a significant and growing number of these medical futility
conflicts remain intractable. 3
Few jurisdictions in the world have developed an adequate mechanism to
handle this expanding subset of stalemate cases. But the few that have
designed and implemented such mechanisms seem to enjoy some measure of
success. 4 Accordingly, many clinicians and commentators elsewhere are
calling for the establishment of similar special adjudicatory dispute resolution
mechanisms. 5
The paradigmatic adjudicatory dispute resolution mechanism is a court of
law. But almost nobody thinks that is an appropriate model for this type of
conflict. 6 First, litigation is cumbersome. It is both time consuming and

1. See infra Section II.C.
2. See infra Section II.D to II.E.
3. See infra Section III.A.
4. This article focuses on the dispute resolution mechanism in TADA. The other most
notable and innovative dispute resolution mechanism for medical futility disputes is the Ontario
Consent and Capacity Board. See, e.g., ONT. CONSENT & CAPACITY BD., Welcome,
http://www.ccboard.on.ca/scripts/english/index.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2016); see also
Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 341 (Can.); Gabriel T. Bosslet et al., Reason-Giving and
Medical Futility: Contrasting Legal and Social Discourse in the United States with the United
Kingdom and Ontario, Canada, 150 AM. C. CHEST PHYSICIANS 714 (2016); Mark Handelman &
Bob Parke, The Beneficial Role of a Judicial Process When “Everything” Is Too Much?, 11
HEALTHCARE Q. 46 (2008); Paula Chidwick & Robert Sibbald, Physician Perspectives on Legal
Processes for Resolving End-of-Life Disputes, 14 HEALTHCARE Q. 69 (2011).
5. See infra Section III.B.
6. See generally ALAN MEISEL ET AL., THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISIONMAKING § 3.26 (Wolters Kluwer 3d ed., 2015); Ashley Bassel, Order at the End of Life:
Establishing a Clear and Fair Mechanism for the Resolution of Futility Disputes, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 491, 508 (2010) (“Given the inconsistency and reluctance of courts in addressing futility
disputes, many medical and legal scholars recognized the need for an alternative forum.”).
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expensive. 7 Thus, it cannot usefully address complex, urgent medical issues.
Moreover, because courts are adversarial and open to the public, they are an
unwelcome forum in which to resolve sensitive medical treatment disputes
worthy of privacy. 8
In contrast to a court of law, the dispute resolution mechanism in the Texas
Advance Directives Act (TADA) is tailor designed for medical futility
disputes. It has been in operation for over seventeen years, and policymakers
both around the United States and around the world have been looking to
TADA as a model to follow. 9
Because TADA is so frequently held up as a model to follow, it merits a
careful and thorough examination. The purpose of this article is to critically
evaluate TADA and answer three questions: (1) How do TADA’s dispute
resolution provisions work?, (2) Should other jurisdictions adopt them?, and
(3) What changes are required to make TADA’s dispute resolution provisions
sufficiently fair? 10
I will proceed in seven stages. In Section II, I provide a brief background
on medical futility conflicts. I describe their nature and prevalence. I explain
how they can usually be prevented and resolved informally. But, as the

7. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED.
& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL,
MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 159 (1983) (describing court
involvement with treatment disputes as intrusive, slow, costly, and framed in adversarial terms).
In futility disputes, for example, courts typically issue a temporary injunction ordering continued
treatment pending a full evidentiary hearing, but the patient often dies in the meantime, mooting
the dispute. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing
the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 229, 254 (2008).
8. See Alice Herb & Eliot J. Lazar, Ethics Committees and End-of-Life Decision Making, in
MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS 110, 111
(Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds., 1997).
9. See infra Section III.C.
10. I have written extensively about other aspects of medical futility disputes: impact,
reasons, consequences, and other solutions. This article focuses on only this one type of solution.
See generally, e.g., Douglas White & Thaddeus Pope, Medical Futility and Potentially
Inappropriate Treatment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE 65 (Stuart
Younger & Robert Arnold eds., Oxford University Press 2016); Thaddeus M. Pope, The Texas
Advance Directives Act: Must a Death Panel Be a Star Chamber?, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 42
(2015) [hereinafter Death Panel]; Thaddeus M. Pope, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for
Intractable Medical Futility Disputes, 58 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 347 (2014) [hereinafter Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms]; Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical Futility, in GUIDANCE FOR HEALTHCARE
ETHICS COMMITTEES 88 (D. Micah Hester & Toby Schonfeld eds., Cambridge University Press
2012) [hereinafter Medical Futility]; Thaddeus M. Pope, Surrogate Selection: An Increasingly
Viable, but Limited, Solution to Intractable Futility Disputes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 183 (2010) [hereinafter Surrogate Selection]; Pope, supra note 7; Thaddeus M. Pope,
Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Stop Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75
TENN. L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Medical Futility Statutes].
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growing attention on TADA indicates, medical futility disputes cannot always
be prevented or resolved informally. In a significant subset of cases, the parties
can find no common ground. So, there are, and will continue to be, intractable
medical futility disputes.
In Section III, I review the need and demand for dispute resolution
mechanisms for these remaining stalemate cases. The status quo is for
clinicians to cave-in to surrogate demands for LSMT, even when they think
that the administration of such interventions is medically and ethically
inappropriate, or even cruel. Clinicians are legally risk averse and reluctant to
cause a patient’s death without consent, but their acquiescence to surrogate
demands is reluctant. Many clinicians are unhappy with this status quo. Both
individual clinicians and hospitals are eager to implement adjudicatory
mechanisms to resolve these cases. They see TADA as a leading model.
In Section IV, I turn from explaining the context and motivation for TADA
to an examination of the statute itself. First, I provide a brief history of
TADA. 11 Second, I summarize TADA’s dispute resolution provisions. I walk
the reader, step-by-step, through the operation of all six stages of the dispute
resolution process. Then, in Section V, I turn from the statutory text to
examine TADA in operation on the ground. I describe how Texas hospitals
have used TADA over the past seventeen years.
In Section VI, I turn from a descriptive approach to a normative approach.
While TADA is extremely controversial, I argue neither for nor against the
core idea that health care providers may withhold or withdraw LSMT without
patient or surrogate consent. In other words, I am not evaluating whether
clinicians should be able to stop LSMT without consent. 12 Instead, I am
evaluating how the law authorizes them to do that.
Specifically, I evaluate the degree to which TADA comports with notions
of procedural due process, the “oldest of our civil rights.” 13 Please note that I
am not offering a constitutional analysis of TADA. Instead, I am using (or
borrowing) constitutional principles to evaluate fundamental fairness. 14 The

11. I have provided an even more complete history of proposed and enacted amendments in
the Appendix. See infra Appendix: Legislative History of TADA.
12. This debate continues. For example, United Kingdom clinicians generally may refuse
LSMT without consent, but Ontario clinicians may not. See Hilary Young, Physician
Conscientious Professional Discretion in Canada and the United Kingdom (June 30, 2016)
(unpublished article) (on file with the University of New Brunswick), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802776.
13. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044,
1044 (1984).
14. Not only have other scholars made constitutional arguments, but also a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of TADA is scheduled for trial in 2017. Kelly v. Methodist
Hosp., No. 2015-69681 (Harris Cty. Tex. Jun. 10, 2017) (trial scheduled). Notably, the Texas
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requirements of procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States (U.S.) Constitution embody “tenets of
fundamental fairness.” 15 Accordingly, they provide a useful “template to help
measure” the propriety and fairness of TADA’s dispute resolution
procedures. 16
Finally, in Section VII, I conclude that TADA is not now sufficiently fair.
But the flaws are neither fatal nor irremediable. State legislatures could easily
remedy these defects with modest amendments that have already garnered
widespread support among relevant stakeholders.
II. BACKGROUND: MEDICAL FUTILITY DISPUTES
To appreciate the motivation for, and purpose of, TADA’s dispute
resolution provisions, it is first necessary to understand the nature of medical
futility disputes. Accordingly, in this section I explain: (1) what is a medical
futility dispute, (2) that they are common, and (3) that they can often be
prevented. Furthermore, (4) even when they cannot be prevented, medical
futility disputes can almost always be informally resolved. TADA is designed
to address only the small, yet significant, subset of cases that remain
intractable to communication, negotiation, and mediation.
A.

What is a Medical Futility Dispute?

A medical futility dispute is one in which the parties disagree over whether
to begin or to continue medical intervention. “The paradigmatic medical
futility dispute is one in which the patient’s substitute decision maker
(surrogate) requests aggressive treatment interventions for an imminently
dying or catastrophically chronically-ill patient. However, that patient’s health
care providers consider such treatment to be medically or ethically
inappropriate.” 17
Medical futility disputes can (and do) concern any type of medical
intervention. But almost all of the relevant legislative and judicial activity, as
well as most of the academic commentary, involve disputes over just one
particular type of medical intervention: life-sustaining medical treatment.
There are three distinctive features of disputes over whether to begin or to
continue LSMT.
First, disputes over LSMT involve life-and-death stakes. “LSMT utilizes
mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant an

Attorney General supports the constitutional challenge. Amicus Brief of the State of Texas at 1,
Kelly v. Methodist Hosp. (D. Tex. 2016) (No. 2015-69681).
15. Thomas J. Balch, Are There Checks and Balances on Terminating the Lives of Children
with Disabilities? Should There Be?, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009).
16. Id.
17. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10, at 351.
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individual’s spontaneous vital function.” 18 It is usually administered in a
hospital ICU. The definition of “life-sustaining treatment” in TADA is typical.
It means treatment that, “based on reasonable medical judgment, sustains the
life of a patient and without which the patient will die. The term includes both
life-sustaining medications and artificial life support, such as mechanical
breathing machines, kidney dialysis treatment, and artificially administered
nutrition and hydration.” 19 “Typically, withholding or withdrawing LSMT will
result in the patient’s death.” 20
The second distinctive feature of medical futility disputes is that ICU
patients dependent on LSMT almost never have decision-making capacity.
They lack the “ability to understand the significant benefits, risks, and
alternatives to proposed health care and to make and communicate a health
care decision.” 21 They cannot direct their own medical treatment.
“Consequently, medical treatment decisions for ICU patients [almost always]
must be made by a . . . surrogate.” 22
The third distinctive feature of medical futility conflicts concerns the
identity of the disputing parties. The typical futility dispute is between the
attending physician and the surrogate. The clinician says “stop,” but the
surrogate says “go.” “The clinician thinks that [LSMT is] no longer medically
indicated and that the appropriate treatment plan is for comfort measures only.
The surrogate, on the other hand, rejects this proposed treatment plan, and
directs the clinician to continue [LSMT].” 23
B.

The Move from Definitions to Process

Since the late 1980s, writers and policymakers have articulated four main
definitions of “medical futility.” Two are narrowly circumscribed and defined
by objective clinical criteria: (1) physiological futility and (2) medical
ineffectiveness. 24 Two other positions also purport to “appear” neutral and
scientific like the first two: (3) quantitative futility and (4) qualitative futility,
but they actually include value-laden criteria. 25

18. Id.
19. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.002(10) (1999). The definition of “lifesustaining treatment” in TADA is typical. It means treatment that “based on reasonable medical
judgment, sustains the life of a patient and without which the patient will die. The term includes
both life-sustaining medications and artificial life support, such as mechanical breathing
machines, kidney dialysis treatment, and artificially administered nutrition and hydration.” Id.
20. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10, at 351–52 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 2501(d) (West 2013)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 352.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 364, 367.
25. Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 10, at 32–42.
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While the former two definitions have a mostly clear and definite meaning,
finding consensus on the latter two definitions has proven problematic and
elusive. Lawyers, bioethicists, health care providers, and policy makers have
had enormous difficulty defining treatment that is “futile” or “medically
inappropriate.” Years of debate have failed to produce any consensus. So, by
the mid-1990s, many institutions, professional associations, and commentators
abandoned a definitional approach. They abandoned delineating clinical
indications that would “define” medical futility. Instead, paraphrasing Justice
Potter Stewart’s comment on pornography, many concluded that we can only
“know it when [we] see it.” 26 They instead espoused a procedural, processbased approach. 27
A recent policy statement from five leading critical care medical
associations reconfirms this procedural approach. 28 It includes four key
elements. First, the policy statement recognizes that medical futility conflicts
involve “contested value judgments about what is appropriate treatment.” 29 So,
it would be problematic to give all decision-making authority either to
surrogates or to individual clinicians. Second, the statement maintains that a
process-based approach can “incorporate multiple perspectives to minimize the
risk that the values of any one individual will carry undue weight.” 30 Third, it
concludes that a “process-based approach[] better fulfills democratic ideals for
resolving conflicts involving fundamental interests.” 31 Fourth, the policy
statement predicts that a process-based approach “may allow mutually
agreeable solutions to emerge as the conflict-resolution process unfolds over
time.” 32
C. Medical Futility Disputes Are Common
Conflicts over LSMT in the ICU are common. 33 Indeed, they have recently
been characterized as reaching “epidemic proportions.” 34 A large portion of
these end-of-life treatment conflicts are medical futility disputes. 35

26. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. White & Pope, supra note 10; AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5.5
(2016).
28. Gabriel T. Bosslet et al., An Official ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM Policy Statement:
Responding to Requests for Potentially Inappropriate Treatments in Intensive Care Units, 191
AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1318, 1319 (2015).
29. Id. at 1320.
30. Id. at 1323.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Terrah J. Paul Olson et al., Surgeon-Reported Conflict with Intensivists About
Postoperative Goals of Care, 148 JAMA SURGERY 29 (2013) (“[M]ore than 70% of ICU
clinicians report experiencing conflict weekly.”); John M. Luce & Douglas B. White, The
Pressure to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Therapy from Critically Ill Patients in the
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The problem has been well measured and documented in several different
ways. One is from the perspective of ethics consultation services. For example,
several leading U.S. medical centers have reported that medical futility
disputes comprise a significant percentage of their annual ethics consults:
thirteen percent at Memorial Sloan Kettering, 36 twenty-nine percent at the
University of Michigan Health System. 37 Stanford’s Lucile Packard Children’s
Hospital and the Mayo Clinic have reported similar percentages. 38
The frequency of medical futility conflicts is equally high when measured
from the perspective of ICU clinicians. Several recent surveys of critical care
specialists demonstrate significant levels of conflict over LSMT. 39 For

United States, 175 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1104, 1107 (2007)
(“[D]isagreements between families and clinicians on end-of-life care are commonplace in the
United States.”).
34. Ann C. Long & J. Randall Curtis, The Epidemic of Physician-Family Conflict in the ICU
and What We Should Do About It, 42 CRITICAL CARE MED. 461, 461 (2014).
35. See, e.g., James Downar et al., Nonbeneficial Treatment Canada: Definitions, Causes,
and Potential Solutions from the Perspective of Healthcare Practitioners, 43 CRITICAL CARE
MED. 270, 280 (2015); R.D. Piers et al., Perceptions of Appropriateness of Care Among
European and Israeli Intensive Care Unit Nurses and Physicians, 306 JAMA 2694, 2700 (2011);
Linda L. Maerz et al., Futility and the Acute Care Surgeon, 78 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE
SURGERY 1216, 1217 (2015) (“[D]isagreement between the medical team and the patient or
surrogate was cited as the next most common barrier . . . [to limitation in goals of care when
treatment has been determined to be futile].”). See also generally, Jean-Louis Vincent, Forgoing
Life Support in Western European Intensive Care Units: The Results of an Ethical Questionnaire,
27 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1626 (1999); V.A. Palda et al., Futile Care: Do We Provide It? Why? A
Semistructured, Canada-Wide Survey of Intensive Care Unit Doctors and Nurses, 20 J. CRITICAL
CARE 207 (2005); Robert Sibbald et al., Perceptions of “Futile Care” Among Caregivers in
Intensive Care Units, 177 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1201 (2007). Cf. Michael J. Fisch, Advance
Directives: Sometimes Necessary but Rarely Sufficient, 1 JAMA ONCOLOGY 609, 609 (2015)
(discussing the trend toward using aggressive care for patients at end of life because of the
conflicts inherent in patients’ need to articulate their care wishes, and the ability of both the
physician and the surrogate to act accordingly).
36. Andrew G. Shuman et al., Clinical Ethics Consultation in Oncology, 9 J. ONCOLOGY
PRAC. 240, 241 (2013).
37. Lauren B. Smith & Andrew Barnosky, Web-Based Clinical Ethics Consultation: A
Model for Hospital-Based Practice, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE J., Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 62, 64.
38. David Magnus, Organizational Needs Versus Ethics Committee Practice, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Apr. 2009, at 1, 2; Keith M. Swetz et al., Report of 255 Clinical Ethics Consultations
and Review of the Literature, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 686, 690 (2007) (finding that futility
disputes are one of the primary reasons for hospital ethics consultations).
39. See, e.g., David Cape et al., The Impact of the Rasouli Decision: A Survey of Canadian
Intensivists, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 180, 184 (2016). A Virginia survey found that forty-four hospitals
referred 274 futility cases to their ethics committees in one year. These hospitals further reported
that they refer only twenty percent of futility cases to their ethics committees. Andrew Mitchell,
Staff Report: Development of Life-Sustaining Treatment Guidelines 11–13, in JOINT COMM’N ON
HEALTH CARE, Meeting Archives (Sept. 7, 2016), http://jchc.virginia.gov/3.%20Development%
20of%20Life%20Sustaining%20Treatment%20Guidelines%20CLR.pdf.
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example, a widely-discussed 2014 study from University of California at Los
Angeles found that twenty percent of the medical interventions in five of its
ICUs were either futile or probably futile. 40 Other peer-reviewed surveys have
found similarly high levels of conflict. 41
Furthermore, not only is the volume of futility disputes already high, but it
is also likely to rise even further. 42 There are three main reasons for this. First,
the number of patients who are the subject of futility disputes will increase
with continued growth in the aging population, in the burden of chronic illness,
and in the “technologies used to support vital organ function.” 43 Second, not
only is the number of patients growing, but also the rate of conflict is
increasing. Physicians are increasingly more likely to recommend comfort
measures only, instead of continuing aggressive, curative treatment. 44 This is
the result of shifts both in training and in reimbursement incentives. 45 Third, at
the same time that physicians are increasingly recommending comfort
measures only, surrogates are increasingly likely to resist those
recommendations. Largely for cultural, religious, and ethnic reasons, a
growing proportion of Americans say that doctors should “[d]o [e]verything
[p]ossible to [k]eep [p]atients [a]live.” 46

40. Thanh N. Huynh et al., The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to be Futile in
Critical Care, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1887, 1889 (2013).
41. Andrew M. Courtwright et al., Experience with a Hospital Policy on Not Offering
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation when Believed More Harmful than Beneficial, 30 J. CRITICAL
CARE 173 (2015) (noting two disputes per month just regarding CPR); Whitney Huang, Futile
Medical Treatment Commonplace, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://english.cw.
com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=14865 (reporting rates of futilely-administered care of up to
twenty-four percent among clinicians in Taiwan).
42. See Leigh Page, Doctor Don’t Give Up on Me, MEDSCAPE (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/857725.
43. Downar et al., supra note 35, at 271.
44. “More often . . . it is the medical team that [first] comes to the moment of declaring
futility, concluding that further aggressive interventions are not accomplishing the patient’s goals
of care, and often that additional medical interventions will only cause pain and suffering. When
the family disagrees and insists that treatment continue, dispute arises.” CMTY. ETHICS COMM.,
MEDICAL FUTILITY: STRATEGIES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION WHEN EXPECTATIONS AND LIMITS
OF TREATMENT COLLIDE 6 (2013).
45. See Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 10, at 13–19; Dana R. Lustbader et al.,
Physician Reimbursement for Critical Care Services Integrating Palliative Care for Patients Who
Are Critically Ill, 141 CHEST 787, 789 (2012) (noting that “critical care codes support higher
reimbursement than is available for services billed using standard E/M codes”); Sylvia M.
Burwell, Setting Value Based Payment Goals – HHS Efforts to Improve U.S. Healthcare, 372
NEW ENG. J. MED. 897 (2015).
46. PEW RESEARCH CTR., VIEWS ON END-OF-LIFE MEDICAL TREATMENTS 1, 18 (2013);
Lenworth M. Jacobs et al., Trauma Death: Views of the Public and Trauma Professionals on
Death and Dying from Injuries, 43 ARCHIVES SURGERY 730, 732, 734 (2008); LAKE RESEARCH
PARTNERS, ATTITUDES TOWARD END-OF-LIFE CARE IN CALIFORNIA 20 (2006) (noting that
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D. Many Futility Disputes Can Be Prevented
Benjamin Franklin famously noted that “an Ounce of Prevention is worth a
Pound of Cure.” 47 His advice applies here too. It is better to prevent futility
disputes from arising in the first place than to work harder at resolving them
after they have already arisen. In fact, prevention is not terribly complicated or
difficult. “Most patients do not even want aggressive treatment at the end of
life. 48 Suppose that these patients still had capacity and could make their own
treatment decisions. They and their clinicians would generally agree on the
appropriate treatment plan. There would be no conflict.” 49
But such consensus is only theoretical. “[T]he patients who are the subjects
of futility disputes almost always lack [decision-making] capacity and cannot
make their own treatment decisions.” 50 Moreover, default rules are misaligned
with majority preferences. Incapacitated patients are presumed to want LSMT
unless they have adequately rebutted that presumption. Because most patients
have not “opted out,” “they receive treatment that they would not have wanted
and that their clinicians do not want to administer.” 51
“Fortunately, rapidly expanding initiatives are helping patients to better
understand their options and to better document their treatment preferences.” 52
But the needle is moving very slowly. Today, most patients still fail to
adequately document their treatment preferences. If these patients had
adequately documented their treatment preferences (declining LSMT when
chronically critically ill), most futility disputes could be avoided. 53
E.

Almost All Futility Disputes Can Be Informally Resolved

While prevention is a first-choice approach, it is not always successful. “If
prevention has failed and conflict [arises], informal [and internal] dispute
resolution mechanisms [available within the hospital] work almost all of the

twenty-seven percent of Californians believe that clinicians should “always do everything
possible to save a life”).
47. Benjamin Franklin, On Protection of Towns from Fire, PA. GAZETTE (Feb. 4, 1735),
quoted in Daniel Kiel, An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Reframing the Debate
About Law School Affirmative Action, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 791 (2011).
48. See LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, supra note 46, at 21.
49. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10, at 352–53.
50. Id. at 353.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Surrogates may not demand treatment that patients themselves have already declined.
See Surrogate Selection, supra note 10, at 214. Similarly, clinicians may not administer
treatments that patients themselves have already declined. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Clinicians May
Not Administer Life-Sustaining Treatment Without Consent: Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary
Sanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 213, 219–20 (2013).
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time. Through further communication and mediation, consensus is reached in
over [ninety-five percent] of medical futility cases.” 54
If the treatment team is not getting anywhere with the surrogate, it can
invite the intervention of ethics consultants, social workers, chaplains,
palliative care clinicians, the ethics committee, external second opinions, and
other experts. These other hospital resources are quite effective at achieving
consensus. 55 Indeed, only a small portion of disputes remain intractable. 56
Clinicians do not want to act contrary to their professional judgments. Nor
do they want to act without patient or surrogate consent. In a medical futility
dispute, these two objectives come into conflict. But they are neither
irreconcilable nor mutually exclusive. Consistent with both of these objectives,
there are three ways to reach consensus in a futility dispute.

54. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10, at 355; Thomas J. Prendergast et al., A
National Survey of End-of-Life Care for Critically Ill Patients, 158 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CARE
MED. 1163, 1163–64 (1998); Emily Ramshaw, Bills Challenge Limits for Terminal Patients,
DALL. MORNING NEWS, reprinted in News Archive, SENATOR ELIOT SHAPLEIGH (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://shapleigh.org/news/1004-bills-challenge-limits-for-terminal-patients (reporting the formal
TADA process was used in only sixty-five of 974 futility disputes); Craig M. Nelson & Blanca
Arriola Nazareth, Nonbeneficial Treatment and Conflict Resolution: Building Consensus,
PERMANENTE J., Summer 2013, at 23, 24–25 (reporting consensus in eighty-seven of ninety-two
cases); Daniel Garros et al., Circumstances Surrounding End of Life in a Pediatric Intensive Care
Unit, 112 PEDIATRICS 371, 373 (2003). Cf. Ellen M. Robinson et al., After the DNR: Surrogates
Who Persist in Requesting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 47 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan. 2017,
at 10, 12 fig. 1 (noting that nineteen of 134 conflicts were intractable).
55. Lance Lightfoot, Incompetent Decisionmakers and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining
Treatment: A Case Study, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 851, 851 (2005) (“The vast majority of ethics
consultations at Texas Children’s result in some form of compromise.”). On the other hand, some
of these compromises may not be entirely knowing and voluntary. Instead of focusing on dispute
prevention or dispute resolution, some clinicians focus on dispute avoidance. See David A. Asch
et al., Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining Treatment by Critical Care Physicians in
the United States: Conflicts Between Physicians’ Practices and Patients’ Wishes, 151 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 288, 291 (1995) (exploring how physicians withdraw
LSMT on the basis of medical futility without the knowledge of the patient or family); David R.
Brush et al., Critical Care Physicians’ Approach to Negotiating with Surrogate Decision Makers:
A Qualitative Study, 40 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1080, 1083 (2012) (showing physicians
deliberately misrepresent options to secure consent); Colleen Gallagher & Ryan F. Holmes,
Handling Cases of Medical Futility, 24 HEC F. 91, 96 (2012) (recommending that clinicians not
present some options).
56. This is the consensus rate not only in national studies but also in Texas. See, e.g.,
Ramshaw, supra note 54 (reporting there were “sixty five documented medical futility cases . . .
in which the family disagreed with the ethics committee’s verdict” in a survey of “five years’
worth of data from eleven Texas hospitals, and two years’ worth of data from another five
hospitals”); Robert L. Fine & Thomas Wm. Mayo, Resolution of Futility by Due Process: Early
Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 743, 745
(2003) (finding that roughly six percent of futility consultations were unresolvable twenty-four
months after TADA was implemented).
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“First, as discussed above, the clinician might eventually get consent from
the surrogate.” 57 With intensive communication and mediation, the physician
and surrogate might find some common ground. Second, consensus might be
reached by “replacing” the objecting clinician with a substitute. Sometimes,
“the [treating] clinician [can] find a new health care provider willing to provide
the treatment that the surrogate wants.” 58 While the current health care
provider may be unwilling to administer the surrogate-requested treatment, it is
sometimes possible to transfer the patient to another physician or facility that is
willing to provide the disputed treatment. Third, if neither of these first two
solutions is possible, the clinician is often able to replace the current surrogate.
If the requested treatment really is harmful or non-beneficial, then the
surrogate may not be complying with applicable decision-making standards.
Through replacement, the clinicians obtain a new surrogate who will
(hopefully) consent to the recommended treatment plan. “This is the mirror
image of the second path to consensus. Instead of transferring the patient to a
new health care provider who agrees with the surrogate, the clinician replaces
the current surrogate with a new surrogate who agrees with the clinician.” 59
But while surrogate selection is an effective mechanism for many disputes,
it cannot resolve some significant categories of conflict. In many cases, it will
be difficult for providers to demonstrate that surrogates are being unfaithful to
patient instructions or preferences. Since too few individuals engage in
adequate advance care planning, applicable instructions and other evidence
regarding patient preferences are rarely available. Therefore, it is often
impossible to demonstrate surrogate deviation. Other times, the available
evidence shows that the surrogate is acting faithfully and making decisions
consistent with the patient’s instructions, preferences, and values. 60
In short, most futility disputes can be resolved through reaching consensus
in one of three ways: (1) clinicians obtain consent from the current surrogate,
(2) the clinicians and surrogate find another clinician or facility willing to
provide the requested treatment, or (3) clinicians obtain consent from a new
(replacement) surrogate.
But some conflicts are not amenable to any of these three solutions.
“[E]ven impeccable communication and relational skills may not resolve
conflicts that arise from fundamental difference in values between families and

57. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10, at 356.
58. Id. See infra Section IV.C.5.
59. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10, at 356. See also Surrogate Selection,
supra note 10, at 230–35; Mitchell, supra note 39, at 12 (reporting that ten percent of Virginia
futility disputes were resolved by clinicians reaching consensus with a replacement surrogate).
60. See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 341, 345 (Can.). See also generally
Golubchuk v. Salvation Army Grace Gen. Hosp., [2008] MBQB 49 (Can. Man.) (affirming
plaintiff’s argument that the surrogate was acting consistent with the patients’ values).
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clinicians.” 61 In these intractable disputes, the clinician and surrogate are
“stuck” with each other.
III. TADA IS VIEWED AS A MODEL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
Unable to obtain the surrogate’s consent to the proposed treatment plan,
most clinicians “cave-in” to surrogate demands. Physicians in most U.S.
jurisdictions are afraid to refuse surrogate-requested treatment that they deem
inappropriate or even cruel. 62
In contrast, TADA has proven effective at allowing (or empowering)
physicians to avoid providing medical treatment that they judge medically or
ethically inappropriate. Accordingly, other jurisdictions have been looking to
TADA as a model to follow.
A.

Clinicians Want Safe Harbor Legal Immunity

Many medical facilities across the United States have developed policies
for dealing with medical futility. Indeed, among other professional medical
organizations, the American Medical Association (AMA) recommended a
process-based approach. The AMA process includes seven steps: four aimed at
“deliberation and resolution,” two aimed at securing alternatives in cases of
“irresolvable differences,” and a final step aimed at “closure when all
alternatives have been exhausted.” 63
But with respect to this final step, the AMA correctly noted that “the legal
ramifications of this course of action are uncertain.” 64 This uncertainty is
“chilling” and deters clinicians from proceeding without surrogate consent. 65
“Immunity . . . is critical in the view of most, if not all, practicing

61. Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (2007).
62. See Thaddeus Mason Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End of Life: Getting
Beyond the Limits of the Talking Cure, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 143, 159, 189 (2007).
63. AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFS., Medical Futility in End-ofLife Care: Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 281 JAMA 937, 939 (1999).
AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5.5 (2016).
64. Id. at 940.
65. Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 10, at 49–52.
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physicians.” 66 In short, it is unclear how effective medical futility dispute
resolution guidelines can be in the face of legal uncertainty. 67
One Texas physician observed: “In my near [ten] year experience with
consults related to medical futility, many a physician, nurse, and even hospital
ethics committee member felt that certain treatments in a given case were futile
and should be stopped; however, few were willing to do so in the face of
potential legal jeopardy.” 68
B.

Most Clinicians Accede to Surrogate Demands

In short, for clinicians, safe harbor legal immunity is not just attractive, it
is essential. It allows providers to avoid practicing what they judge to be “bad”
or “wrong” medicine. 69 In contrast, without safe harbor legal immunity, most
clinicians usually “follow[] the path of least resistance” 70 and just provide the
treatment. 71 Without legal protection, they “cave-in” to surrogate demands. 72

66. Robert L. Fine, Point: The Texas Advance Directives Act Effectively and Ethically
Resolves Disputes About Medical Futility, 136 CHEST 963, 965 (2009) [hereinafter Texas
Advance Directives Act]. See also Robert L. Fine, The Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999:
Politics and Reality, 13 HEC F. 59, 63 (2001) [hereinafter Politics and Reality]; Robert D. Truog,
Counterpoint: The Texas Advance Directives Act is Ethically Flawed, 136 CHEST 968, 968
(2009) (“Clinicians are often reluctant to invoke their hospital policies without assurances of civil
and criminal immunity . . . .”).
67. Amir Halevy & Amy L. McGuire, The History, Successes and Controversies of the
Texas ‘Futility’ Policy, 43 HOUS. LAW., May–June 2006, at 38, 38 (“[N]o cases went through the
entire process . . . [because] residual legal uncertainty regarding the process still lingered.”).
68. Robert L. Fine, Medical Futility and the Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999, 13
BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. PROCS. 144, 145 (2000).
69. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Physicians and Safe Harbor Legal Immunity, 21 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 121, 121, 132–33 (2012) [hereinafter Safe Harbor]; Steve Connor, Lord Saatchi: ‘Let
New Cures be Tried out on Cancer Patients,’ INDEPENDENT (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.inde
pendent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/lord-saatchi-let-new-cures-be-tried-out-on-cancer-patients8876504 (“Under current law, any deviation from standard procedure is likely to result in guilt for
medical negligence, that is because current law defines medical negligence as deviation from
standard procedure . . . . Therefore the doctor is obliged to stick to the well-worn path even
though the doctor knows that it leads to poor quality of life, followed by death.”); see also
generally Emily R. Carrier et al., High Physician Concern About Malpractice Risk Predicts More
Aggressive Diagnostic Testing in Office-Based Practice, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 1383 (2013)
(supporting a need to temper deference and self-regulation with oversight without creating a
distorting concern for legal risk).
70. Texas Advance Directives Act, supra note 66, at 964.
71. Tom Blackwell, Doctors More Reluctant to Clash with Families over End-of-Life
Decisions in Wake of Supreme Court Ruling, NAT’L POST (Sept. 5, 2014), http://news.national
post.com/news/canada/doctors-more-reluctant-to-clash-with-families-over-end-of-life-decisionsin-wake-of-supreme-court-ruling (physicians are “more reticent about being aggressive in the
face of family opposition”); Huang, supra note 41; Robert Cribb, Stalemate: Deciding Life or
Death, TORONTO STAR (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/09/26/stale
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But just because providers administer LSMT that they judge medically and
ethically inappropriate does not mean that they are happy about it. Clinicians
do not want to provide non-beneficial treatment. 73 Among other reasons,
administering perceived non-beneficial treatment is a leading cause of moral
distress and burnout among nurses and physicians. 74 So, many have been
working to obtain legal safe harbor immunity like that provided by TADA.
C. Attempts and Recommendations to Copy TADA
In a recent survey of over 700 clinicians, eighty-two percent agreed that
current dispute resolution mechanisms for medical futility disputes are
inadequate. 75 They want better and more effective mechanisms. 76 Specifically,
most responding clinicians agreed that empowering a committee to arbitrate
medical futility conflicts would be a good option. 77 While it is not the only
option, a majority of clinicians want a non-judicial tribunal with adjudicatory
power.
Many view TADA as a model or paradigm of what this type of dispute
resolution mechanism should look like. 78 Consequently, it is no surprise that
other U.S. states have been looking to copy TADA.
1. Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Copy TADA
Some U.S. states have taken material, concrete steps to copy TADA. Idaho
and Virginia took a legislative approach, while New Jersey tried to adopt
TADA through the courts. None of these attempts were successful. But these
undertakings themselves demonstrate the attractiveness of TADA.

mate_deciding_life_or_death.html; Mary Jane Dykeman, A Year After Rasouli, End of Life
Debate Continues, LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov. 28, 2014, at 12.
72. Thomas William Mayo, The Baby Doe Rules and Texas’s “Futility Law” in the NICU,
25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2009) (“Without some measure of protection, physicians
might seriously consider . . . passively going along with everything the surrogate decision maker
asks for.”); see also Sapna Kaul et al., Physician Response to Patient Request for Unnecessary
Care, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 823, 831 (2015).
73. See Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 10, at 17 (“[P]roviders resist inappropriate
treatment requests out of concern for the patient.”).
74. Daniel Schwarzkopf et al., Perceived Nonbeneficial Treatment of Patients, Burnout, and
Intention to Leave the Job Among ICU Nurses and Junior and Senior Physicians, CRITICAL CARE
MED. (forthcoming 2017); Annette M. Browning, Moral Distress and Psychological
Empowerment in Critical Care Nurses Caring for Adults at End of Life, 22 AM. J. CRITICAL
CARE 143, 144 (2013).
75. Downar, supra note 35, at 273.
76. See id. Managing conflicts of interest involves a considerable amount of staff time. Liz
Forbat et al., Conflict in a Paediatric Hospital: A Prospective Mixed-Method Study, 101
ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 23, 24 (2016).
77. Id. at 274.
78. Fine & Mayo, supra note 56, at 746.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

108

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 10:93

In February 2009, Idaho state Senator Patti Anne Lodge introduced Senate
Bill (S.B.) 1114, which was closely patterned after TADA. 79 While the bill
unanimously passed the Idaho Senate in March 2009, Idaho has a bicameral
legislature. The bill was never favorably reported from a House committee.
For decades, Virginia law has provided that physicians need not “prescribe
or render health care to a patient that the physician determines to be medically
or ethically inappropriate.” 80 In cases of conflict, a Virginia physician must
make a “reasonable effort” of at least fourteen days “to transfer the patient to
another physician who is willing to comply with the request.” 81 But if no
transfer is effected, it is unclear whether the physician could stop LSMT at the
end of the fourteen days.
Proposed legislation sought to confirm that “the physician may cease to
provide care that he has determined to be medically or ethically
inappropriate.” 82 After that bill failed to advance, the legislature asked the
Virginia Joint Commission on Health Care (VJCHC) to study the issue. 83
During 2016, the VJCHC considered proposals modeled explicitly on
TADA. 84 Ultimately, the VJCHC rejected the TADA proposal and voted to
“[i]nclude in the 2017 VJCHC work plan that staff form a work group to study
health care decisions more broadly, focused on preventing/improving
outcomes of treatment decision conflict in Virginia.” 85
In New Jersey, the attempt to copy TADA did not take the form of a
legislative bill as in Idaho and Virginia. Instead, it took the form of an
appellate brief. The brief was authored by the New Jersey Hospital
Association, the Medical Society of New Jersey, and the Catholic HealthCare
Partnership of New Jersey. 86 These organizations asked the appellate division
of the state superior court to judicially adopt provisions closely patterned on
TADA. 87 As in Idaho, this attempt was unsuccessful. The court dismissed the
case as moot after the patient died. 88
79. S. 1114, 60th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2009).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (West 2009).
81. Id.
82. H.B. 2135, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015).
83. H. J. Res. 61, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (“RESOLVED by the House of
Delegates, the Senate concurring, That the Joint Commission on Health Care be directed to study
current legal and regulatory requirements regarding the medical appropriateness of
lifeprolonging care and options to clarify due diligence and the appropriate course of action
when no physician can be found to carry out a patient’s requests.”).
84. Mitchell, supra note 39, at 27.
85. 2016 Meetings, VA. J. COMM’N ON HEALTH CARE (Nov. 9, 2016), http://jchc.virginia.
gov/meetings.asp (under “Minutes”).
86. Brief & Appendix of Amici Curiae New Jersey Hospital Ass’n et al. at 1, Betancourt v.
Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (No. A-003-849-08T2).
87. Id. at 59–64.
88. Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
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2. Professional Organizations Endorse Copying TADA
Apart from formal judicial and legislative action to copy TADA, a
significant number of professional organizations have endorsed copying
TADA. These include medical associations, bar associations, and others.
Medical societies in at least four states have passed resolutions calling on their
legislatures to copy TADA. Medical associations in California, 89 North
Carolina, 90 Washington, 91 and Wisconsin 92 considered such resolutions. Legal
associations have done the same. For example, the New York State Bar
Association published a similar recommendation. 93 And at a less formal level,
major organizations in Maryland 94 and Connecticut 95 have held conferences
and workshops exploring whether and how to follow TADA.
Furthermore, still others are looking to copy TADA, though in a less open
and transparent manner. The authors and architects of TADA report that they
get calls and inquiries from lobbyists and advocates all over the country. 96
Plans, strategies, and bills are being drafted and devised. 97
3. Academic Literature Recommends Copying TADA
In addition to the efforts of legislatures, policymakers, and professional
organizations, a number of commentators have argued that other states should
follow TADA. 98 For example, one author concludes that “the Texas model

89. H.D. Res. 506–09, 2009 Leg., Ref. Comm. E (Cal. 2009).
90. Arthur E. Kopelman et al., The Benefits of a North Carolina Policy for Determining
Inappropriate or Futile Medical Care, 66 N.C. MED. J. 392, 394 (2005).
91. WASH. STATE MED. ASS’N, OFFICIAL ACTIONS OF THE 2010 HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
RES. A-2 – WSMA OPINION ON MEDICAL FUTILITY IN END-OF-LIFE CARE (2010).
92. WIS. MED. SOC’Y, 2004 House of Delegates Action on Resolutions and Board Reports,
103 WIS. MED. J. 91, 91 (2004).
93. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, HEALTH LAW SECTION, SUMMARY REPORT ON HEALTHCARE
COSTS: LEGAL ISSUES, BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS 4–5 (Sept. 2009).
94. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility & Maryland Law, MID-ATLANTIC ETHICS
COMM. NEWSL., 1, 1–2 (2011).
95. See generally Joan W. Feldman, Hartford Hosp. Ethics Comm., Medical Futility
Summit: Medicine, Law & Ethics (Oct. 21, 2010).
96. Thomas Wm. Mayo, Medical Futility in Texas: Myths and Misconceptions, UT
SOUTHWESTERN MED. CTR. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://repositories.tdl.org/utswmed-ir/handle/2152.5/
1405.
97. TEX. HOSP. ASS’N, KEY MESSAGES ON TEX. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES ACT (2011) (“The
law that Texas passed in 1999 has been a model for other states . . . .”) (on file with author).
98. Michael Mazzeffi, The High Cost of Dying, BALT. SUN (Oct. 27, 2015, 12:43 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-dying-cost-20151027-story.html (“Other
states should consider similar laws.”).
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offers an excellent blueprint for other states to follow.” 99 Others similarly
assess TADA as a “thoughtful approach” and an “admirable project.” 100
Not surprisingly, the Texas lawyers and physicians who were involved in
innovating TADA believe that other states should follow suit. Every mother
thinks that her child is the most beautiful. These architects and builders argue
that “the extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanism found in the Texas
Advance Directives Act should . . . serve as a national model that appropriately
balances the interests of all involved parties in these difficult cases while still
leading to a defensible solution.” 101
But TADA’s founding fathers are not alone. Even independent scholars
have similarly encouraged “other jurisdictions in the United States [to]
consider codifying a procedure similar to the one in Texas.” 102 These
recommendations have been widely published in medical journals, 103 nursing
journals, 104 law journals, 105 and bioethics journals. 106

99. Jacob M. Appel, What’s So Wrong with Death Panels?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22,
2009, 11:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacob-m-appel/whats-so-wrong-with-death_b_
366804.html. “A national medical futility law, modeled on the Texas Advance Directives Act of
1999, is a long-overdue and life-saving measure.” Id.
100. Michael Kapottos & Stuart Youngner, The Texas Advanced Directive Law: Unfinished
Business, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34, 34, 37 (2015).
101. Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: Finding
the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 261, 289 (2008); Kelley Shannon, End-of-Life
Legislation Dies in Texas House, PLAINVIEW DAILY HERALD (May 23, 2007, 7:00 PM),
http://www.myplainview.com/news/article/End-of-life-legislation-dies-in-Texas-House-85262
59.php/ (reporting that Rep. Dianne Delisi “hopes the proposed Texas legislation will be used as a
model for other states”); Texas Advance Directives Act, supra note 66, at 967 (“[O]ther states
should develop similar laws.”); Robert L. Fine, A Model for End-of-Life Care, WASH. TIMES
(Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/06/a-model-for-end-of-lifecare/.
102. John M. Zerwas, Jr., Medical Futility in Texas: Handling “Reverse Right-to-Die”
Obstacles Without Constitutional Violation, 43 TULSA L. REV. 169, 198 (2007).
103. Harris C. Jacobs, The Texas Advance Directives Act—Is It a Good Model?, 33
SEMINARS PERINATOLOGY 384, 389 (2009); Piotr Szawarski, Classic Cases Revisited: Mr. David
James, Futile Interventions and Conflict in the ICU, 17 J. INTENSIVE CARE SOC’Y 244, 247
(2016) (“In the USA a fine example is provided by [TADA].”). See also Kopelman et al., supra
note 90. See also generally Matthew H. Armstrong et al., Medical Futility and Nonbeneficial
Interventions: An Algorithm to Aid Clinicians, 8 MAYO CLINIC PROCS. 1599, 1606 (2014); John
Massie, Medical Impasse: A Problem as Big as Texas?, 50 J. PEDIATRICS CHILD HEALTH 658
(2014).
104. Jocelyn A. Olmstead & Michael D. Dahnke, The Need for an Effective Process to
Resolve Conflicts Over Medical Futility: A Case Study and Analysis, 36 CRITICAL CARE NURSE,
Dec. 2016, at 21, 22 (describing TADA as an “important attempt” and a “starting point”).
105. Mary Johnston, Futile Care: Why Illinois Law Should Mirror the Texas Advanced
Directives Act, ANNALS OF HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE, Spring 2014, at 27, 36–38; Lisa L.
Dahm, Medical Futility and the Texas Medical Futility Statute: A Model to Follow or One to
Avoid?, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2008, at 25, 31; Kendra Norman, Live and Let Die: The
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IV. TEXAS ADVANCE DIRECTIVE ACT
Now that we have established the reasons for examining TADA, we can
turn to an examination of the statute itself. After providing a brief history of
the legislation, I walk the reader through all six steps of its dispute resolution
process. 107
A.

What is TADA?

The focus of this article is on the unique dispute resolution mechanisms in
the Texas Advance Directive Act. TADA is a comprehensive health care
decisions statute that comprises Chapter 166 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code. 108 Chapter 166 is itself divided into four subchapters: (1) General
Provisions, (2) Directive to Physicians, (3) Out-of-Hospital Do-NotResuscitate Orders, and (4) Medical Power of Attorney. 109 These four
subchapters are themselves comprised of seventy-one separate statutory
sections.
The dispute resolution provisions are just a small part of TADA. They
comprise just four of TADA’s seventy-one sections. 110 And they comprise just
700 of TADA’s 15,000 words. In short, TADA does far more than just resolve
medical treatment conflicts. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, I will
refer to TADA’s dispute resolution provisions simply as “TADA.”
B.

History of TADA: 1993 to 1999

In 1993, representatives from most of the major hospitals in Houston,
Texas, formed the Houston City-Wide Task Force on Medical Futility. 111 They
developed a nine-step procedure for resolving futility disputes. The goal of the
Consequences of Oklahoma’s Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act, 68 OKLA L. REV. 585, 613–
18 (2015); see also, e.g., Patrick Moore, An End-of-Life Quandary in Need of a Statutory
Response: When Patients Demand Life-Sustaining Treatment That Physicians are Unwilling to
Provide, 48 B.C. L. REV. 433, 468 (2007).
106. Laurence B. McCullough, Professionally Responsible Clinical Ethical Judgments of
Futility, AM. J. BIOETHICS, July 2015, at 54, 54; Kapottos & Youngner, supra note 100, at 34–35;
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Medical Futility and Assisted Suicide, 20 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS 274, 275 (2009). See also generally, e.g., Nancy S. Jecker, Futility and Fairness: A
Defense of the Texas Advance Directive Law, AM. J. BIOETHICS, July 2015, at 43.
107. See infra Appendix: Legislative History of TADA.
108. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.001 (2015) (noting that “[t]his chapter may be
cited as the Advance Directives Act”).
109. See generally id. § 166.
110. Id. §§ 166.045, 166.046, 166.052, 166.053.
111. Amir Halevy & Baruch Brody, A Multi-Institution Collaborative Policy on Medical
Futility, 276 JAMA 571, 571 (1996); Amir Halevy & Baruch A. Brody, The Houston ProcessBased Approach to Medical Futility, 14 BIOETHICS F. 10, 11 (1998); Halevy & McGuire, supra
note 67, at 39; Elizabeth Heitman & Virginia Gremillion, Ethics Committees Under Texas Law:
Effects of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 13 HEC F. 82, 88 (2001).
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taskforce was to create a common policy because the members thought that
would be more ethically and legally defensible than individual facilities
proceeding on their own.
But this was still insufficient. Making the protocol citywide made it seem
more reasonable, but it still did not give the protocol the force of law. The
guidelines had “no legal standing,” 112 and without a “positive statement in the
law . . . the threat of malpractice litigation would force most physicians to
honor families’ requests for even the most inappropriate aggressive
treatment.” 113 As discussed above, safe harbor legal immunity is critical. 114
Four years later, the state legislature was considering comprehensive
TADA legislation intended to replace three prior laws: the Texas Natural
Death Act from 1977, the Texas Medical Power of Attorney Act from 1989,
and the Out of Hospital Do-Not-Resuscitate Act from 1993. In replacing these
three older laws, TADA was intended to coordinate and update their
provisions. The Houston dispute resolution procedures were largely
incorporated into this bill.
In February 1997, Senator Mike Moncrief introduced TADA in S.B.
414. 115 By April, the bill passed the Senate, and by May, it passed the
House. 116 But because of various amendments, the versions of S.B. 414 passed
by each chamber were not identical. So, a conference committee prepared a
report that both the House and Senate quickly adopted. However, when the
final version of S.B. 414 was sent to Governor Bush, in June 1997, he vetoed
it. 117
Governor Bush’s veto proclamation noted that S.B. 414 contained “several
provisions that would permit a physician to deny [LSMT] to a patient who
desires them.” 118 Indeed, opponents had charged that S.B. 414 would
“encourage medical professionals to participate in euthanasia . . . by denying
life-saving medical treatment . . . to patients whose lives they independently

112. Heitman & Gremillion, supra note 111, at 90.
113. Id. at 88.
114. See supra Section III.
115. S. 75-13, 75th Sess., at 227 (Tex. 1997).
116. S.B. 414, 1997 Leg., 75th Sess. (Tex. 1997); S. 75-43, 75th Sess., at 832 (Tex. 1997); H.
75-84, 75th Sess., at 3861 (Tex. 1997);
117. Heitman & Gremillion, supra note 111, at 90.
118. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (June 20, 1997) [hereinafter
Governor’s Proclamation].
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decide are not worth living.” 119 The Governor was concerned about these
“potentially dangerous defects.” 120
To address the Governor’s concerns, at least twenty-four interested
organizations formed the Texas Advance Directives Coalition (Coalition). 121
Its membership included advisors from the legislative and executive branches.
It included medical groups like the Texas Hospital Association and the Texas
Medical Association, and it even included pro-life groups like Texas Right to
Life and Texas Alliance for Life. 122 This was a remarkable collaborative.
Despite this heterogeneous composition, the Coalition was able to reach a
“watershed compromise.” 123 The Coalition reached consensus on safeguards
and protections designed to resolve the “defects” that concerned Governor
Bush. 124
So, when the legislature reconvened in 1999, Senator Moncrief used the
Coalition’s language to amend the vetoed 1997 legislation. He again
introduced TADA. 125 By April, it passed the Senate, and by May, it passed the

119. TEX. H. RES. ORG., HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION BILL ANALYSIS:
CONSOLIDATING STATUTES GOVERNING LIVING WILLS AND OTHER ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 2
(1997), http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba75r/sb0414.pdf#navpanes=0.
120. Governor’s Proclamation, supra note 118. As discussed below, nothing in the version of
TADA that was ultimately enacted mitigates these risks. See infra Section VI.
121. Politics and Reality, supra note 66, at 63–67; Heitman & Gremillion, supra note 111, at
82–92; Hanoch A. Patt, Strange Bedfellows: The Ethics and Politics of Medical Futility in Texas,
at 25 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas School of Public Health) (on file with
author).
122. See Dennis Pacl, Presentation to the Texas Medical Association: Report of Council on
Health Service Organizations 19, https://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=4858 (noting some
of the organizations involved in the Texas Advance Care Directives Coalition and a
recommendation the TMA continue to work with the Texas Advance Directives Coalition).
Members included: AARP, ADAPT-Texas, American Cancer Society, Catholic Health
Association of Texas, Free Market Foundation, Institute for Disability Access, National Right to
Life Committee, Texas Alliance for Life, Texas Association for Home Care, Texas Association of
Homes & Services for the Aging, Texas Attorneys for Advance Directives, Texas Center for
Disability Studies, Texas Health Care Association, Texas Healthcare Trustees, Texas Hospital
Association (and eleven hospital affiliates), Texas Legal Services Center, Texas Medical
Association, Texas Medical Directors Association, Texas Nurses Association, Texas & New
Mexico Hospice Association, Texas Partnership for End-of-Life Care, Texas Physicians’
Resource Council, Texas Right to Life Committee, and United Cerebral Palsy of Texas. Richard
J. Castriotta, Am. Coll. of Chest Physicians Annual Meeting: Protecting Patients: The TADA, and
the Limits of Surrogate Directives (October 2013) (PowerPoint) (on file with author).
123. Ramshaw, supra note 54.
124. See id. (noting that the “watershed compromise” created the “ten-day transfer rule”).
125. See S.B. 1260, 1999 Leg., 76th Sess. (Tex. 1999). An identical bill, H.B. 3527, was
introduced by Representative Garnet Coleman on the very next day in March 1999, but it was laid
aside after S.B. 1260 had advanced to the House floor. See generally H.B. 3527, 1999 Leg., 76th
Sess. (Tex. 1999).
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House. 126 Governor Bush signed the bill on June 18, 1999. TADA went into
effect on September 1, 1999. 127
C. Dispute Resolution Provisions of TADA
The TADA dispute resolution provisions address the situation in which “an
attending physician refuses to honor a patient’s advance directive or a health
care or treatment decision made by or on behalf of a patient.” 128
With respect to LSMT, this can happen in two basic ways. First, the
surrogate may be requesting LSMT that the physician thinks is inappropriate.
Second, the surrogate may be refusing LSMT that the physician thinks should
be provided. 129 The former situation (a medical futility dispute) is the far more
common situation and the one on which this article focuses.
TADA encourages the “physician’s refusal” to “be reviewed by an ethics
or medical committee.” 130 This review process is comprised of six basic steps
that proceed in a roughly chronological order: (1) The attending physician
refers the dispute to a review committee, (2) the hospital provides the surrogate
with notice of committee review, (3) the review committee holds an open
meeting, (4) the review committee makes its decision and provides a written
explanation, (5) the hospital attempts to transfer the patient to a willing facility,
and then (6) the hospital may stop LSMT. 131
TADA mandates that hospitals continue to administer disputed LSMT
during the first five steps of this review. 132 In addition, TADA specifies two
situations under which the process can be shortened or extended.
1. The Attending Physician Refers the Dispute to a Review Committee
In a futility dispute, at some point, the attending physician determines that
one or more forms of LSMT are inappropriate. Since the default presumption
is that all physiologically effective LSMT will be provided, the physician

126. See Tex. S.B. 1260.
127. Id. § 3.01; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.001 (1999) (effective Sept. 1,
1999).
128. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(a); see also id. § 166.002(7) (defining “health care
or treatment decision” to include “consent, refusal to consent, or withdrawal of consent to health
care, treatment, service, or a procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual’s physical or
mental condition”).
129. TADA’s notice provisions specify separate notice statements for each situation. See infra
Section IV.C.2.
130. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(a).
131. Id. § 166.046(a)–(e).
132. Id. § 166.046(a). But see H.B. 3074, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015) (Springer),
(TADA was recently amended to exempt clinically assisted nutrition and hydration from the
types of affected LSMT).
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ordinarily seeks the consent of the patient’s surrogate to a proposed plan to
withhold or withdraw treatment. 133 The surrogate refuses consent.
TADA includes no requirement that hospitals first exhaust less restrictive
alternatives before invoking its formal process. 134 But while not required by
TADA, the attending physician will typically work on obtaining the
surrogate’s consent through additional family meetings and the intervention of
other specialists like chaplains and ethics consultants. 135 Such communication
and mediation typically resolve the dispute. 136 But if none of this works (or
even if it was never tried 137), then the attending physician may invoke TADA’s
formal dispute resolution provisions.
TADA’s dispute resolution procedures are written such that they could be
invoked by patients, surrogates, or physicians, 138 but they are typically invoked
by the attending physician. 139 They are triggered when the attending physician
“refuses to honor a patient’s advance directive or a health care or treatment
decision made by or on behalf of a patient.” 140 The attending physician notifies
the review committee of her refusal, effectively asking or petitioning it to
adjudicate the dispute.

133. Indeed, even when clinicians have a legal right to withhold or withdraw LSMT without
surrogate consent, they must still at least consult with the surrogate. See, e.g., Tracey v.
Cambridge U. Hosp. NHS Found. Trust [2014] EWCA Civ. 33 (appeal taken from Eng.);
Wawrzyniak v. Chapman & Livingstone, 95903 C.P.S.O. (2015) (Coll. of Physicians and
Surgeons of Ont.) (censuring physicians for failing to “take adequate steps to discuss the
proposed change [in code status] or “to have a proper discussion” with the patient’s SDM); see
also Pope, supra note 7, at 257–58 (discussing liability for infliction of emotional distress in
some instances where physicians “unilaterally withdr[a]w LMST”).
134. In the matter of DP, 2010, CanLII 42949 (Can. Ont. C.C.B) (tribunal that decided dozens
of futility conflicts refused because “the health practitioner had to do more before he could
determine that [the surrogate] ‘did not comply’”).
135. Several bills aimed to amend TADA to first require an advisory ethics consultation. See,
e.g., S.B. 439, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. § 4 (Tex 2007); H.B. 3474, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. § 6 (Tex.
2007); S.B. 303, 2013 Leg., 84th Sess. § 2 (Tex. 2013).
136. See supra Section II.E. Because this is so successful, many think that TADA should
require a consultation before formal review. See, e.g., Mayo, supra note 72, at 1015.
137. The chairs of several Texas hospital review committees have informed the author that
clinicians sometimes move to immediately invoke the formal dispute resolution mechanism
without first trying more communication or mediation.
138. See Mayo, supra note 72, at 1005 n.8. (“[I]t can be invoked by patients, surrogates and
physicians alike.”).
139. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(a) (2015) (“If an attending physician refuses
to honor . . . .”).
140. Id.
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2. The Hospital Provides the Surrogate with Notice of Committee
Review
Once the attending physician refers the case to the review committee, the
committee will convene a “meeting” to consider the case. 141 Presumably to
enable the surrogate to attend and meaningfully participate at the committee
hearing, the hospital must inform the surrogate of the committee review
process at least two days in advance. 142 Specifically, this notice must be
provided “not less than [forty-eight] hours before the meeting called to discuss
the patient’s directive, unless the time period is waived by mutual
agreement.” 143
At the same time that the hospital provides notice of the review committee
meeting, it must also provide the surrogate with two written documents: (1) a
statutorily-mandated written “statement” of rights 144 and (2) a state-maintained
list of health care providers and referral groups. 145 TADA encourages, but does
not require, the hospital to provide a third document, (3) which describes its
committee review process. 146
a. The hospital provides the surrogate with a written statement of rights
While not in the original 1999 TADA, a 2003 amendment added specific
language that hospitals must provide to surrogates. 147 The required written
statement basically summarizes the surrogate’s rights in plain, less legalistic
language. 148
In cases in which the attending physician refuses to comply with an
advance directive or treatment decision requesting LSMT, the required
statement shall be in “substantially” the following form:
When There Is A Disagreement About Medical Treatment: The Physician
Recommends Against Life-Sustaining Treatment That You Wish To Continue
You have been given this information because you have requested [LSMT],
which the attending physician believes is not appropriate. This information is
being provided to help you understand state law, your rights, and the resources

141. Id. § 166.046(b)(4).
142. Id. § 166.046(b)(2).
143. Id.
144. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(b)(3)(A).
145. Id. § 166.046(b)(3)(B).
146. Since TADA provides little direction on how a review committee is to operate, the
process will vary from hospital to hospital. Id. § 166.046(b)(1).
147. Id. § 166.052(a).
148. Id. (stating a hospital’s statement need only be “substantially” in form specified in the
statute).
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available to you in such circumstances. It outlines the process for resolving
149
disagreements about treatment among patients, families, and physicians.

A similar statement must be provided when there is a disagreement about
medical treatment in which the physician recommends LSMT that the
surrogate wishes to stop. 150
b. The hospital provides the surrogate with the state registry list
In addition to the “statement of rights,” 151 the hospital must also provide
the surrogate with a copy of a state-maintained list of health care providers and
referral groups that have “volunteered their readiness either to consider
accepting transfer or to assist in locating a provider willing to accept
transfer.” 152
This list is maintained by the Texas Health Care Information Council
(THCIC), an agency of the Texas Department of State Health Services. THCIC
was created in 1995 to collect data and report on health care activity in
hospitals and health maintenance organizations operating in Texas. 153 TADA
requires the THCIC to “maintain a registry listing the identity of and contact
information for health care providers and referral groups, situated inside and
outside [Texas], that have voluntarily notified the council they may consider
accepting or may assist in locating a provider willing to accept transfer of a
patient.” 154
As of December 2016, the list includes only three health care providers. 155
It also includes four law firms and two advocacy groups. 156 While the “registry
list [of] health care providers and referral groups” is maintained by the THCIC,
the State of Texas does not “endorse[] or assume[] any responsibility for any
representation, claim, or act of the listed providers or groups.” 157 Furthermore,
the listing of a provider or referral group in the registry “does not obligate the
provider or group to accept transfer of or provide services to any particular
patient.” 158

149. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.052(a).
150. Id. § 166.052(b).
151. Id. § 166.052.
152. Id. § 166.046(b)(3)(B).
153. See id. §§ 108.001– .016.
154. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.053(a).
155. TEX. HEALTH CARE INFO. COLLECTION CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STATISTICS, TEX.
DEP’T OF STATE HEALTH SERVS., Registry List of Health Care Providers and Referral Groups,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/thcic/Registry.shtm (last updated Dec. 14, 2016).
156. Id.
157. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.053(a), (d).
158. Id. § 166.053(b).
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c. The hospital provides the surrogate with a description of its review
process
While TADA requires hospitals to provide the “statement of rights” and
the “registry list,” it merely suggests and recommends that the hospital also
provide the surrogate with a third document: “a written description of the
ethics or medical committee review process and any other policies and
procedures related to this section adopted by the health care facility.” 159 Since
TADA provides almost zero direction on how a review committee is to
operate, the process will vary (often materially) from hospital to hospital.
3. The Review Committee Holds an Open Meeting
At this point, at least forty-eight hours before the review committee
hearing, three things have happened. First, the attending physician has refused
to honor the surrogate’s treatment decision for continued LSMT. Second, the
physician has referred the case to the hospital review committee. Third, the
surrogate has been apprised of her rights.
TADA does not authorize physicians to act unilaterally. The attending
physician’s refusal must be reviewed by an “ethics or medical committee.” 160
But hospitals have significant discretion here. TADA is mostly silent as to the
composition or training of the committee that reviews the dispute between the
surrogate and clinician. 161 The statute provides only that “[t]he attending
physician may not be a member of that committee.” 162
With respect to the meeting itself, TADA provides that the surrogate is
entitled to attend, 163 but it does not specify any other rules or procedures.
TADA is silent on who else the surrogate may bring (e.g. an attorney, a
religious adviser). It is also silent on the scope of the surrogate’s participation
(e.g. right to ask questions).
While not specified in the statute, the review committee meeting typically
proceeds in two stages. It “begins with a presentation from the attending
physician and other members of the health care team.” 164 During this
presentation, clinicians “provide reasoning and evidence to support why they

159. Id. § 166.046(b)(1).
160. Id. § 166.046(a).
161. Id. § 166.002(6) (“‘Ethics or medical committee’ means a committee established under
Sections 161.031-161.033.”).
162. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(a).
163. Id. § 166.046(b)(4)(A).
164. Robert W. Painter, Developments in Texas Advance Directives, HOUS. LAW., Sept.–Oct.
2009, at 20 (Painter also maintains a website, Surviving Hospitals, at http://www.surviving
hospitals.com/).
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believe further curative care would be medically futile.” 165 Most committees
then “allow the patient and family to present their arguments and evidence.” 166
4. The Review Committee Makes Its Decision and Provides a Written
Explanation
After the meeting, the review committee will usually deliberate in private,
separate from the treating clinicians and family. Once it reaches a decision, the
committee must prepare a “written explanation of the decision reached during
the review process” and provide the surrogate with a copy. 167 This “written
explanation” must also be included in the patient’s medical record. 168
A hospital review committee’s consideration of a medical futility dispute
typically results in one of three main outcomes. First, the committee can agree
with the surrogate. Second, it can agree with the referring physician. Third,
sometimes the conflict is mooted by the patient’s death or by subsequent
family-clinician agreement.
First, if the review committee agrees with the surrogate, then the physician
must make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient to a physician who is
willing to comply with the surrogate. Hospital “personnel shall assist the
physician in arranging the patient’s transfer to: (1) another physician; (2) an
alternative care setting within that facility; or (3) another facility.” 169
Second, if the committee agrees with the referring physician (and it usually
does), then the dispute resolution process may continue. Published studies
indicate that review committees agree with referring physicians in more than
seventy percent of cases. 170
Third, sometimes the conflict is mooted because the patient dies during the
review process. 171 Other times, conflict is mooted because surrogates are
persuaded by the fact that the review process affirms the attending physician’s

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(b)(4)(B). TADA does not specify any particular
format or minimum length or detail. See also infra Section VII.E.
168. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(c).
169. Id. § 166.046(d).
170. See, e.g., Castriotta, supra note 122 (reporting that the Memorial Hermann review
committee agreed in thirty of thirty-four cases); Courtwright et al., supra note 41, at 4 (reporting
that the Optimum Care Committee at the Massachusetts General Hospital agreed with physicians
in seventy-five percent of futility cases); see also Becca Aaronson, A Texas Senate Bill Would
Revise the State’s End-of-Life Procedure, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/03/31/health/state-senate-bill-would-revise-end-of-life-procedure.html (reporting
seventy percent agreement in a survey of 200 Texas hospitals over six years and that this rate of
agreement is not unique to Texas review committees).
171. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 39, at 12 (reporting that thirty-six percent of conflicts
were resolved because the patient died).
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decision that LSMT really is inappropriate treatment. 172 These surrogates are
happy that the committee takes the burden of decision making off their
shoulders. 173 On the other hand, some surrogates may consent because they
experience the TADA process as fait accompli. 174
But while some disputes are resolved by or during the review process,
others are not. Some surrogates continue to request LSMT that both the
attending physician and the ethics or medical committee concluded was
inappropriate.
5. The Hospital Attempts to Transfer the Patient to a Willing Facility
If the review committee agrees with the referring physician and the
surrogate does not agree with that decision, then “the physician shall make a
reasonable effort to transfer the patient to a physician who is willing to comply
with the directive.” 175 Moreover, in these cases in which the surrogate is
requesting LSMT “that the attending physician has decided, and the [review
process] has affirmed is inappropriate treatment, the patient shall be given
available [LSMT] pending transfer.” 176
The rationale for this “reasonable effort to transfer” requirement is a
recognition of variability in medical practice. The current treating facility is
unwilling to provide the treatment requested by the surrogate, but another
facility might be willing to provide that treatment.
In fact, it is unlikely that another physician at the same facility will accept
a transfer at this point in the process. So, TADA further provides: “If the
patient is a patient in a health care facility, the facility’s personnel shall assist

172. Robert L. Fine, The History of Institutional Ethics at Baylor University Medical Center,
17 PROCS. BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. 73, 80 (2004) (“[F]amilies come to understand that there is a
finite limit to the time that they can avoid accepting the treatment team’s recommendation. They
come to understand that they are not in control of the situation.”); Martin L. Smith et al., Texas
Hospitals’ Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 35 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1271,
1273 (2007); Regina Okhuysen-Cawley et al., Institutional Policies on Determination of
Medically Inappropriate Interventions: Use in Five Pediatric Patients, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL
CARE MED. 225, 228 (2007).
173. Fine, supra note 172, at 81; Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
985, 999 (2009).
174. See Tom Mayo, Medical Futility in Texas: Myths and Misconceptions (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://repositories.tdl.org/utswmed-ir/bitstream/handle/2152.5/1405/medical%20futility%20
myths%20and%20misconceptions.pdf?sequence=2 (explaining that the “[e]thics consultation
‘roundtable’ discussion may be intimidating and coercive”); see also Nora O’Callaghan, Dying
for Due Process: The Unconstitutional Medical Futility Provision of the Texas Advance
Directives Act, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 527, 544 (2008).
175. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(d) (2015).
176. Id. § 166.046(e).
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the physician in arranging the patient’s transfer to: . . . (2) an alternative care
setting within that facility; or (3) another facility.” 177
The surrogate may concurrently look for a transfer on her own. She can
use the “registry list” of health care providers and referral groups that have
volunteered their readiness to consider accepting transfer or to assist in
locating a provider willing to accept transfer. Surrogates may contact providers
or referral groups on the list or others of their choice to get help in arranging a
transfer. “The patient is responsible for any costs incurred.” 178
Just because the hospital must search for a transfer does not mean that it
will find one. It is difficult to find another facility willing to accept a patient
who was the subject of TADA. Few hospitals are willing to accept the transfer
of a patient after another hospital’s review committee has already determined
that continuing LSMT is inappropriate. 179
On the other hand, transfer is not impossible. 180 For example, the family of
Spiro Nikolouzos transferred him from St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital to
Avalon Place, a long-term care facility. 181 More recently, a June 2011 case at
Texas Children’s Hospital garnered significant media attention. Fourteen yearold Jordan Allen had been diagnosed months earlier with inoperable

177. Id. § 166.046(d).
178. Id. § 166.046(e).
179. See Bosslet et al., supra note 28, at 1325; Leigh Hopper & Todd Ackerman, Inside of
Me, My Son Is Still Alive, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 16, 2005) (reporting that the hospital treating Sun
Hudson contacted forty facilities with a newborn intensive care unit but none would accept him);
Mary Ann Roser, Time Running Out for Baby on Life Support, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 8,
2007, at B01 (“Children’s Hospital . . . contacted [thirty] hospitals on behalf of Emilio
[Gonzales] . . . [but] none would take him.”). Commentators have observed that transfer is not a
great safeguard. See, e.g., O’Callaghan, supra note 174, at 568–69; Medical Futility Statutes,
supra note 10, at 25. Notably, before the imposition of EMTALA, hospitals were unwilling to
accept transfers of even those patients for whom they thought treatment indicated. See, e.g., Sara
Rosenbaum et al., Case Studies at Denver Health: ‘Patient Dumping’ in the Emergency
Department Despite EMTALA, the Law That Banned It, 31 HEALTH AFFS. 1749, 1753 (2012).
180. See Smith et al., supra note 172 (reporting that hospitals effected transfers in thirty of
256 futility cases); see also, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 39, at 12 (reporting that two percent of
conflicts were resolved because the patient was transferred); Ramshaw, supra note 54 (reporting
that eleven patients were transferred after the review committee ruled against them).
Organizations like Texas Right to Life that assist families with these transfers say they can be
found, but not in ten days. See, e.g., Testimony on S.B. 439, S. Comm. on Health & Human Svcs.
293:10 (Apr. 25, 2007), http://tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=24&clip_id
=2724 (Elizabeth Graham); see also id. at 388:45 (testimony of Brian Potts); id. at 399:40
(testimony of Elizabeth Graham).
181. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Man in Center of Life-Support Debate Dies in San Antonio, HOUS.
CHRON. (June 1, 2005, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Man-at-cen
ter-of-life-support-debate-dies-1498485.php.
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glioblastoma, a particularly lethal cancer. 182 Jordan’s parents were able to
transfer him, five days into the ten-day waiting period, to Atrium Medical
Center, a nearby long-term acute-care facility. 183
One additional reason that transfers are rarely found and made is that the
time the hospital and surrogate have to find one is limited. The transfer period
is not indefinite. After being served with the review committee’s “written
explanation,” the surrogate has only ten days to accomplish a transfer. 184
6. The Hospital May Stop Life-Sustaining Treatment
The patient must continue to be given LSMT until he or she can be
transferred to a willing provider. But the waiting period to find a transfer lasts
for only ten days from the time the surrogate was given the committee’s
“written explanation” that LSMT is not appropriate. If a willing provider
cannot be found within ten days, then the treating facility may withdraw
LSMT.
Neither the physician nor the health care facility are “obligated to provide
[LSMT] after the [tenth] day after the . . . written decision” is provided to the
surrogate. 185 The inability to transfer is intended to serve as confirmation of the
review committee’s decision. 186 The refusal of other facilities to provide the
disputed LSMT supposedly indicates or confirms that the review committee
was correct. Accordingly, LSMT “under this section may not be entered in the
patient’s medical record as medically unnecessary treatment until the [ten-day
waiting period] has expired.” 187
7. Special Adjustments to Timing
The previous six steps fully describe the TADA dispute resolution
mechanism, but TADA also specifies two situations under which this standard
dispute resolution process can be shortened or extended. First, the process can

182. Todd Ackerman, Teen’s Transfer Diffuses Life Support Battle, HOUS. CHRON. (June 30,
2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Teen-s-transfer-defuses-life-supportbattle-2078227.php.
183. Id.
184. O’Callaghan, supra note 174.
185. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(e) (2015).
186. The final step of the process is illustrated by the case of Tirhas Habtegiris, one of the
rare cases in which a hospital was able to circumvent patient privacy rules and explain its actions
under TADA. BAYLOR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, Tirhas Habtegiris Case: Media Statement,
http://www.baylorhealth.com/articles/habtegiris.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006), “reprinted in
Thaddeus Pope, Tirhas Habtegiris Case: Media Statement, http://thaddeuspope.com/images/FN
173_Habtegiris_-_Baylor_Press_Release_Feb._2006_.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).” Notably,
Baylor had to take extra measures to defend its decision, because it was not perceived as fair
because of the state-sanctioned process itself. Id.
187. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(f).
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be shortened if the patient has already been the subject of a committee review.
Second, the transfer period can be extended by court order.
a. Prior committee review can shorten the process
If, during a previous admission to a facility, a patient’s attending physician
and the review process have determined that LSMT is inappropriate and the
patient is readmitted to the same facility within six months, then that hospital
does not need to follow any of the above six steps. 188
This makes sense. Suppose the patient is transferred from Hospital X to a
long-term care facility. Then, the patient suffers an emergent issue such as
respiratory distress and returns to Hospital X. 189 If the patient is in
substantially the same condition, why start the entire dispute resolution process
all over again from scratch? The result would probably be the same.
To bypass the dispute resolution process in these cases, the patient’s
attending physician and a consulting physician who is a member of the
facility’s review committee must confirm that the previous review committee
decision is still applicable. They must document on the patient’s readmission
that the “patient’s condition either has not improved or has deteriorated since
the review process was conducted.” 190
b. Courts can sometimes extend the transfer waiting period
Just as TADA permits special circumstances to shorten the dispute
resolution process, it also permits special circumstances to lengthen the
process. TADA gives the surrogate only ten days to find a facility willing to
provide disputed LSMT. But the surrogate can seek an extension by asking the
“appropriate district or county court” to lengthen the ten-day period. 191
But getting the court to elongate the ten-day period is not easy. The
surrogate’s ability to obtain a judicial extension of the transfer period is
extremely limited. TADA permits the court to grant such an extension only if
there is a “reasonable expectation that a physician or health care facility that
will honor the patient’s directive will be found if the time extension is
granted.” 192
Procedurally, these TADA lawsuits are typically initiated by the filing of
an original petition that requests a temporary restraining order preventing
discontinuation of treatment. An oral hearing for a temporary injunction
normally follows within fourteen days, but the temporary restraining order may

188. Id. § 166.046(e-1).
189. This is exactly what happened in one of the most famous U.S. futility cases. See, e.g., In
re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
190. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(e-1).
191. Id. § 166.052(a)(6).
192. Id. § 166.046(g).
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be extended once for another fourteen days upon a showing of good cause. 193
“The court must grant additional time only if the patient establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable expectation that
another physician or health care facility will accept the patient and continue
care.” 194
Despite these restrictive standards, in several cases surrogates have been
able to obtain either temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. 195
Hospitals have also agreed to an extension just before a pending hearing. 196
However, in many other cases the courts have denied requests for
extensions. 197
D. TADA Provides Safe Harbor Legal Immunity
Importantly, TADA not only outlines a dispute resolution mechanism but
also offers safe harbor legal immunity for following it. The statute provides:
“A physician, health professional acting under the direction of a physician, or
health care facility is not civilly or criminally liable or subject to review or
193. Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.
194. Painter, supra note 164.
195. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Houston Methodist’s Special Exceptions
and Motion to Dismiss at 5, Dunn v. Methodist Hosp. (No. 2015-69681) (noting hospital did not
remove life support as planned on November 24, 2015 and patient lived until December 23,
2015); Second Extension of Temporary Restraining Order at 3, Gonzales v. Daughters of Charity
Health Services of Austin, No. 86,427 (Travis County Prob. Ct. May 18, 2007) (after parties
agreed to extend from March 20 to April 10, the court extended to June 6); Hudson v. Tex.
Children’s Hosp., 177 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Tex. App. 2005); Kristina Herrndobler, Court Keeps
Woman on Life Support, BEAUMONT ENTER., Aug. 11, 2006, at A1 (reporting a temporary
restraining order in the case of Daisy Conner); In re Nikolouzos, 179 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App.
2005) (granting an injunction on March 12, until an appeal could be assigned, even though
ultimately finding on March 15 that it had “no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction”); Bill
Murphy, Comatose Surgeon Would Prefer Death, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 21, 2001),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Comatose-surgeon-would-prefer-death-physi
cian-1995199.php (the family sought a temporary restraining order in the case of Joseph Ndiyob);
Emily Ramshaw, Children Fight to Save Mom, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug. 18, 2006), 2006
WLNR 14340226 (temporary restraining order granted for Ruthie Webster).
196. See Todd Ackerman, Transfer Resolves Latest Futile Care Case, HOUS. CHRON. (Jul.
31, 2006), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Transfer-resolves-latest-futile-carecase-1488717.php; see also Todd Ackerman, Woman’s Death Won’t End Futile-Care Law Fight,
HOUS. CHRON. (May 9, 2006), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Woman-s-death
-won-t-end-futile-care-law-fight-1870531.php; Hudson v. Texas Children’s Hosp., 177 S.W.3d
232, 233–34 (Tex. App. 2005) (hospital extended ten-day deadline from November 29 to
December 6, 2004, before the family filed suit).
197. See Lightfoot, supra note 55, at 854 (citing Final Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for
an Extension of Time under the Health & Safety Code Section 166.046(f), Hudson v. Tex.
Children’s Hosp., No. 352,526 (Harris County Prob. Ct. Tex. Mar. 14, 2005)); Nikolouzos v. St.
Luke’s Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 679–80 (Tex. App. 2005) (dismissing the appeal of the temporary
injunction for lack of jurisdiction).
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disciplinary action by the person’s appropriate licensing board if the person has
complied with the procedures outlined in Section 166.046.” 198
This legal protection is important. Without it and unable to secure
surrogate consent to stopping LSMT, providers generally continue to comply
with requests that they consider inappropriate. 199 Moreover, the requirements
for earning immunity under TADA are clear, measurable, and precise. So,
health care providers can be sure about when they are qualified for safe harbor
protection. This clarity is important. Legal immunity is effective only when
providers have confidence and certainty about when they have it. 200
E.

The TADA Process Is Optional

While TADA outlines a six-step dispute resolution process with specific
written disclosures and other details, using that process is optional. Hospitals
may refuse requested LSMT without following these six steps. And they may
still have liability protection.
TADA explicitly anticipates this situation in three separate sections. First,
“[i]f an attending physician refuses to comply with a directive or treatment
decision and does not wish to follow the procedure established under Section
166.046,” TADA simply requires that LSMT “be provided to the patient . . .
only until a reasonable opportunity has been afforded for the transfer of the
patient to another physician or health care facility willing to comply.” 201 The
physician’s liability is limited, so long as she complies with the professional
standard of care. 202 But since there is significant variability in ICU medicine, it
is difficult for clinicians to ascertain the standard of care. 203
Second, a separate section of TADA confirms that clinicians may also
have rights under common law. “This subchapter does not impair or supersede
any legal right or responsibility a person may have to affect the withholding or
198. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.045(d) (2015). See also id. § 166.044 (“A
physician or health care facility [or “health professional, acting under the direction of a
physician”] that causes life-sustaining treatment to be withheld or withdrawn from a qualified
patient in accordance with this subchapter is not civilly liable . . . criminally liable or guilty of
unprofessional conduct.”).
199. See supra Section III.A.
200. Medical Futility, supra note 10, at 96; Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 10, at 78;
Safe Harbor, supra note 69, at 73.
201. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.045(c).
202. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.044. The difficulty of ascertaining the standard of care
makes following this process riskier than following TADA, which is not linked to the standard of
care. Medical Futility, supra note 10, at 96 (discussing operation of legal safe harbors). See also
generally Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10, at 359–66 (discussing the difference
between laws that operate as green lights versus yellow lights).
203. Laura Hawryluck et al., Multi-Professional Recommendations for Access and Utilization
of Critical Care Services: Towards Consistency in Practice and Ethical Decision-Making
Processes, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 260 (2011).
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withdrawal of [LSMT] in a lawful manner.” 204 This section imposes only one
affirmative obligation: LSMT “is required to be provided [sic] the patient . . .
until a reasonable opportunity has been afforded for transfer of the patient to
another physician or health care facility willing to comply.” 205
Third, TADA recognizes that LSMT may be denied to a patient in a triage
situation. “This chapter may not be construed to require the provision of
[LSMT] that cannot be provided to a patient without denying the same
treatment to another patient.” 206
V. HOSPITAL EXPERIENCE WITH TADA
Now that we have examined how TADA works, we can turn to look at
how hospitals have used it. Unfortunately, TADA has never included any
reporting requirements. 207 Consequently, no thorough and systematic data
exists describing how Texas hospitals have used TADA over the past
seventeen years. Nevertheless, there are some small-scale studies. Some were
conducted right after TADA went into effect in 1999. Some were conducted in
the 2000s. And a few more recent studies have been conducted since 2010.
A.

Early Hospital Experience with TADA (1999 to 2004)

Baylor University Medical Center reported that in the twelve months
before TADA, it had fourteen futility cases. 208 Of these, two patients died
during the consultation process even with maintenance of LSMT. 209 In the
other twelve cases, the family agreed to withdraw LSMT, but in one case it
took the family about a month to agree. 210
In the first sixteen months after TADA, Baylor reported thirty-six futility
cases. 211 In twenty-nine, the family promptly agreed to withdraw LSMT and
focus on palliative care. 212 “Five cases were pursued through the [TADA]
dispute resolution process.” 213 In three of these, the family agreed after

204. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.05.
205. Id. § 166.051.
206. Id. § 166.009.
207. Several bills have tried to add such a requirement. See, e.g., S.B. 303, 2013 Leg., 83d
Sess. (Tex. 2013). In contrast, every state that has authorized medical aid in dying has included a
detailed reporting requirement. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.865 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE §
70.245.150 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5293 (2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
443.19 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-111 (2016).
208. Fine, supra note 172, at 79.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Fine, supra note 172, at 79.
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receiving the review committee’s report. 214 In the remaining two cases, the
patient died during the ten-day waiting period. 215
B.

Later Hospital Experience with TADA (2005 to 2010)

By the mid-2000s, several studies went beyond the walls of a single
facility and measured the use of TADA more broadly. For example, a 2007
study surveyed 200 Texas hospitals. Respondents reported reviewing 256
futility cases over the first five years of TADA (1999 to 2004). 216
The families of seventy-one patients agreed to discontinue treatment. 217
“Thirty patients were transferred to another facility,” and seventy-eight
patients died before the ten-day waiting period expired. 218 “[Eight] patients
improved, . . . and appropriateness of treatment was reassessed.” 219 After the
waiting period expired, seventy-eight patients were still alive. 220 Hospitals
discontinued treatment for thirty-three, and despite review committee
decisions, hospitals continued treatment for forty-five. 221
A second study looked at five years’ worth of information from eleven
large hospitals and two years’ worth of data from five other large hospitals.
The surveyed hospitals reported a total of 974 medical futility cases, but they
used TADA in only sixty-five of those cases. 222 The hospitals actually
withdrew treatment in only twenty-seven of those cases. 223 Twenty-two
patients died receiving treatment as they awaited transfers. 224
C. Recent Hospital Experience with TADA (2010 to 2015)
The most recent available data suggest that hospitals rarely use TADA. 225
The Texas Hospital Association (THA) surveyed its members in 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012. THA reports that in 2009, the TADA dispute resolution
214. Id.
215. Id.; Fine & Mayo, supra note 56.
216. Smith et al., supra note 172, at 1271–72.
217. Id. at 1273.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Smith et al., supra note 172, at 1273.
222. Texas Advance Directives Act, supra note 66, at 967.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. “Jeanine Graf, medical director of the pediatric intensive care unit at Texas Children’s
Hospital in Houston, . . . told us she has served on that hospital’s bioethics committee for at least
[fifteen] years. Once a year or every other year, Graf said by phone, the committee decides a
child’s care should end because more care would be futile.” W. Gardner Selby, Texas Right to
Life Exaggerates on Claim of ‘Faceless Hospital Panel’ Determining Treatment, POLITIFACT
(May 30, 2014, 5:40 PM), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2014/may/30/texas-rightlife/texas-law-gives-hospital-panels-sway-over-cutting-/.
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process was initiated just two times at two multi-hospital systems. 226 In 2010,
the TADA process was initiated only one time at one hospital system. 227 In
2011, usage ticked up. The THA survey shows that TADA was used twentyone times by sixteen hospitals or hospital systems. 228
In 2012, THA again surveyed its member hospitals. The 202 respondents
reported that TADA had been used thirty times between 2007 and 2012. 229 “Of
those cases, [ten patients] died during the [ten-day period], six patients were
transferred to another provider and four continued [to receive] treatment past
the [ten-day] period.” 230 Extrapolating from this sample of one-third of Texas
hospitals, one might estimate that TADA is used fifteen times per year
statewide. 231 And one can estimate that treatment is actually withdrawn only
five times per year. 232
On the other hand, the THA data may not be accurate or representative. A
single hospital study at Memorial Hermann examined its TADA experience
from 2000 to 2013. 233 The hospital reported that it had thirty-four cases during
this time period (about 2.4 per year). 234 The committee agreed with the
referring physician in thirty of the thirty-four cases. Of these, the families of
three patients agreed to discontinue treatment, four patients were transferred,
and seven died during the ten-day waiting period. 235 The hospital discontinued
treatment for fifteen. 236
D. Summary of Hospital Experience with TADA
While available studies suggest that Texas hospitals rarely use TADA,
these understate the impact and effect of TADA for two reasons. First, the
more recent unpublished studies indicate far lower usage rates than the
published studies. Those unpublished studies may be neither statistically valid
nor reliable. For example, it is unclear whether THA member hospitals are
representative of all Texas hospitals.

226. Id. (citing an email from Lance Lunsford, Vice President for Advocacy
Communications, Texas Hospital Association, to POLITIFACT (May 21, 2014, 12:22 PM)).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Aaronson, supra note 170.
230. Id.
231. If TADA were used thirty times in six years, that is five times per year. If 200 hospitals
represent one-third of all hospitals, then total usage is fifteen times per year.
232. See Aaronson, supra note 170.
233. Castriotta, supra note 122.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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Second, focusing on only hospitals’ actual use of TADA fails to account
for its “shadow effect.” 237 If families know the hospital has this “weapon,”
then they may (reluctantly) consent to the recommended treatment plan,
precluding the need to formally resort to the TADA mechanism. 238
Analogously, in chess, the winner prevails not by actually taking the
opponent’s king but instead by merely demonstrating that the king’s capture is
inevitable. 239
VI. TADA FAILS TO AFFORD ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
I have now established the purpose, operation, and usage of TADA. In this
section, I turn from a descriptive account to a normative account. Specifically,
I evaluate and assess whether TADA affords adequate procedural due process.
I conclude that it does not; TADA is not sufficiently fair.
I am not alone. TADA is often described as a “due process” approach. 240
But many charge that this due process “is more illusory than real.” 241 Some
legal commentators have colorfully observed that TADA affords hospital
patients with fewer protections than other Texas law affords either to tenants
facing eviction from rental property or to automobile owners threatened with
repossession. 242 Even Texas hospital lawyers have conceded TADA’s
weaknesses. 243 Even TADA’s primary authors admit that the law could be
improved. 244

237. Pope & Waldman, supra note 62, at 193. Analogously, the EEOC must conciliate before
filing discrimination lawsuits against employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). But since employers
often desire to avoid litigation, the EEOC may not always make reasonable demands and
conciliate in good faith. Cf. Mach Mining v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
238. Mayo, supra note 174, at slide 22.
239. U.S. CHESS FEDERATION, OFFICIAL RULES OF CHESS § 4A (Tim Just ed., 6th ed. 2014).
Similarly, the impact of Senator McCarthy’s investigations was not limited to those actually
summoned to Washington. The impact extended far more widely, to many more who never spoke
out, because they were afraid of becoming the target of investigation. NORMAN H. FINKELSTEIN,
WITH HEROIC TRUTH: THE LIFE OF EDMUND R. MURROW 7 (2005) (“His accusations held . . . in
fear . . . and an unwritten state of self-censorship enveloped the nation.”); ARTHUR HERMAN,
JOSEPH MCCARTHY: REEXAMINING THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF AMERICA’S MOST HATED
SENATOR 220–21 (2000).
240. See, e.g., Fine & Mayo, supra note 56, at 743.
241. Truog, supra note 61, at 3; Truog, supra note 173, at 1000. See also Robert D. Truog,
Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED 1558, 1559 (2007) (“The law . . . fails
to provide medical patients with basic due-process protections . . . .”); Diana Wray, In Texas, a
Hospital Ethics Panel - Not the Patient or Family - Decides Whether to End Care, HOUS. PRESS
(Feb. 9, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/in-texas-a-hospital-ethics-panel-not
-the-patient-or-family-decides-whether-to-end-care-8141585.
242. O’Callaghan, supra note 174, at 559–61.
243. Hearing on S.B. 439, S. Comm. on Health & Human Svcs., 2:50:00 (April 12, 2007),
http://tlcsenate.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=2943 (testimony of Michael Regier); TEX.
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Despite being framed as a matter of “due process,” this is not a
constitutional analysis. The focus of the present inquiry is on fundamental
fairness. 245 As U.S. law students quickly learn, a constitutional Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process analysis requires “state action.” 246 So, it
may not be directly applicable to private, non-governmental hospitals. To be
sure, some writers have assessed whether even a private hospital’s use of
TADA constitutes “state action” such that constitutional protections are
triggered. 247 But that is not our present concern. 248
In this article, I look to constitutional requirements only as guideposts to
assess TADA from an ethical and public policy perspective. 249 The elements of
due process have been well developed in hundreds of court opinions, and they
provide a cogent framework for our fairness analysis. 250 In short, I am going to

HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 97 (“[S]ome clarification in state law may be appropriate to make it
easier for families to understand and participate in the decision-making process.”).
244. Mayo, supra note 72, at 1013 (“[A] number of amendments would make the law work
more effectively, more ethically, and more fairly.”); id. at n. 36 (TADA is “the best that could
have been coaxed out of a very diverse advisory panel . . . .”); id. at 1017 (“[T]here are still ways
for the law to be improved . . . .”); Texas Advance Directives Act, supra note 66, at 967 (“The
Texas law is certainly not perfect . . . [it] is the worst method for resolving intractable futility
disputes, except for all the others . . . . [I]t can clearly be improved . . . and other states should
develop . . . improvements based on the experience in Texas.”).
245. Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 2000) (finding that even
a private entity must afford due process when it holds significant power over the physician);
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 825 (N.J. 1963).
246. See generally Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288
(2001).
247. See generally, e.g., Nora O’Callaghan, When Atlas Shrugs: May the State Wash Its
Hands of Those in Need of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment?, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 291 (2008);
Zerwas, supra note 102, at 183–92.
248. While several litigants have briefed challenges under both the federal and Texas
constitutions, plaintiffs have not pursued such cases once the patient (usually due to death) no
longer had a stake in the outcome. Consequently, no court has yet ruled in the constitutionality of
TADA. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint at § VII, Gonzales v. Seton Fam. of Hosps., 1:07cv-00267, No. A07CA267 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2007); see also Notice of Removal, AguochaOhakweh v. Baylor College of Med., No. 4:16-CV-00903 (S.D. Tex. April 4, 2016). See also
generally Plaintiff’s Original Petition; Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary
Injunction, and Permanent Injunction; and Request for Disclosure, Gonzales v. Seton Family of
Hosps., 1:07-cv-00267, No. 86427 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. Tex. Mar. 20, 2007); Order of
Dismissal, In re Roberson-Reese, No. 04:06-cv-02258 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2006). On the other
hand, at least one constitutional challenge is moving forward. Plaintiff’s Original Verified
Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Dunn v.
Methodist Hosp., No. 2015-69681 (Harris Cty. Dist. Ct. Tex., filed Nov. 20, 2015) (“This case is
about whether it is constitutional to strip plaintiff of his life without due process of law.”).
249. See Balch, supra note 15. Cf. Diane A. Desierto, Rawlsian Fairness and International
Arbitration, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 939, 962 (2015).
250. See, e.g., O’Callaghan, supra note 174, at 561.
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borrow constitutional notions of procedural due process because they offer a
relevant and lucid measure of fundamental fairness.
Before we begin assessing the degree to which TADA satisfies specific
elements of due process, we must first be mindful of two overarching
principles. First, more extensive due process is required when a more
significant interest is impacted. 251 Here, the stakes are literally “life and
death.” Therefore, particularly careful due process is required. 252
Second, more due process is required when the “risk of error” is high. 253
Due process rules are “meant to protect persons not from the deprivation
[itself] but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or
property.” 254 Here, there is an especially high risk error for two main reasons.
First, futility determinations are not purely medical judgments but are the
“product of exceedingly complex value judgments.” 255 Second, even to the
extent that they are medical judgments, there are significant limits to accurate
prognostication. 256
In the following six subsections, I examine the degree to which TADA
comports with the following elements of procedural due process: (1) neutral
and independent decision maker, (2) appellate review, (3) notice, (4) statement
of decision, (5) criteria to guide decision, and (6) other due process concerns.
A.

TADA Lacks a Neutral and Independent Decision Maker

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is axiomatic that a . . . ‘fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’” 257 A fair tribunal is one with a

251. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161–63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
252. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussing a factors test for procedural
due process analysis); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (discussing the need
for case-by-case consideration of circumstances when death is at stake); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION § 8129(a) (April 2016 update to 1st ed.).
253. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344.
254. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
255. Cameron Stewart, Futility Determination as a Process: Problems with Medical
Sovereignty, Legal Issues and the Strengths and Weakness of the Procedural Approach, 2
BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 155, 157 (2011). See also generally Robert M. Veatch, What It Means to
Be Dead, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 45, 45 (1977); Bosslet et al., supra note 4; Sofia Morati, The
Development of ‘‘Medical Futility’’: Towards a Procedural Approach Based on the Role of the
Medical Profession, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 369, 371–72 (2009).
256. Keith M. Swetz et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their Answers) on Medical Futility,
89 MAYO CLINIC PROCS. 943, 944–45 (2014); Truog, supra note 173, at 989; Douglas B. White
& Mark Wicclair, Limits on Clinicians’ Discretion to Unilaterally Refuse Treatment, 21 AM. J.
CRITICAL CARE 361, 362 (2012);
257. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009) (citing In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
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“neutral and detached judge.” 258 “[A]n impartial decision maker is
essential.” 259 Indeed, the neutrality of the decision maker is widely thought to
be the most important part of due process. 260
Perhaps the most significant fairness problem with TADA is its delegation
of decision-making power to the hospital’s very own internal review
committee. Since the committee is comprised of hospital clinicians and
administrators, it is hardly a neutral and independent decision maker. 261 It is
“predisposed” to find for the hospital. 262
In one survey of 200 Texas hospitals, fifty-six percent reported having a
“medical appropriateness review committee distinct from their ethics
committee.” 263 Half of these committees had five or fewer members. 264 Most
were wholly comprised of physicians and hospital administrators. 265 Hardly
any included community representatives. 266 Consequently, there is a
significant risk that such committees may be biased towards the interests of
hospital management. 267
Harvard Professor Robert Truog has lamented the TADA review
committee’s lack of neutrality in a long series of prominent articles noting,
“This is hardly an impartial tribunal.” 268 He has observed that review
committee members “are unavoidably ‘insiders.’” 269 Truog is concerned that
TADA “gives an unwarranted amount of power to the clinicians and hospitals
over patients and families who hold unpopular beliefs or values.” 270

258. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972).
259. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
260. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
261. Stewart, supra note 255; O’Callaghan, supra note 174, at 597–98; Thaddeus M. Pope,
Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute
Resolution Mechanism, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257, 294 (2009).
262. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
263. Smith et al., supra note 172, at 1272.
264. Id. Memorial Hermann does not use its ethics committee for TADA, but instead uses a
Medical Appropriateness Review Committee (MARC) comprised of a physician chair plus three
physicians appointed by the CMO and three nurses appointed by the CNO. Castriotta, supra note
122. While the ethics committee has some disciplinary and other diversity, the MARC has far
less. Pope, supra note 261, at 291; E.B. Eason et al., Withdrawal of Life Sustaining Treatment in
Children in the First Year of Life, 28 J. PERINATOLOGY 641, 641 (2008).
265. Smith et al., supra note 172, at 1272.
266. Id. See also Andrew Courtwright & Martha Jurchak, The Evolution of Hospital Ethics
Committees in the United States: A Systematic Review, 27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 322, 324 (2016).
267. Morten Magelssen et al., Sources of Bias in Clinical Ethics Case Deliberation, 40 J.
MED. ETHICS 678, 678 (2014).
268. Truog, supra note 173, at 1000.
269. Truog, supra note 61, at 2.
270. Jeffrey P. Burns & Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 132 CHEST 1987,
1991 (2007).
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Truog argues that TADA’s placement of the life-and-death decision in the
hands of hospital review committees is too provider friendly because “[m]ost
of these committee members are doctors, nurses, and other clinicians from the
hospital community . . . [thus] involvement of the hospital ethics committee
fails to bring the diversity of the community into the deliberative process.” 271 It
runs the risk of “becoming a rubber-stamp mechanism” that does not respect
diversity. 272
Truog is not alone. I have also warned of the dangers of giving life-anddeath adjudicatory power to hospital committees. 273 I will not repeat those
arguments here. Suffice it to say that hospital review committees are
overwhelmingly internal and intramural bodies. They are comprised of
professionals employed directly or indirectly by the very same institution
whose decision the review committee adjudicates. When the decision maker
has a pecuniary interest in the outcome, it is not sufficiently neutral and
independent. 274
Committee members cannot be fair and impartial when the propriety of
administering expensive LSMT must be weighed against a financial loss to the
very hospital that provides those committee members with privileges and a
source of income. 275 “[A]ctual futility cases are almost always intertwined with

271. Robert D. Truog, Counterpoint: The Texas Advance Directives Act Is Ethically Flawed:
Medical Futility Disputes Must Be Resolved by a Fair Process, 136 CHEST 968, 969 (2009).
272. Truog, supra note 61, at 3; Robert D. Truog, Rebuttal from Dr. Truog, 136 CHEST 972,
972 (2009) (suggesting that TADA is unnecessary and that ethics committees should not have
unchecked decision-making power). See also Truog, supra note 173, at 988 (“[F]utility cases
most commonly involve . . . the more marginalized and disadvantaged segments of our society.”);
Katherine Montgomery Hunter, Limiting Treatment in a Social Vacuum: A Greek Chorus for
William T., 145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 716, 717 (1985) (arguing for “some semblance of a
community . . . to buffer . . . caretakers from social and administrative pressures”).
273. See generally Pope, supra note 261; Thaddeus M. Pope, The Growing Power of
Healthcare Ethics Committees Heightens Due Process Concerns, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 425 (2014); Thaddeus M. Pope, Legal Briefing: Healthcare Ethics Committees, 22 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 74 (2011).
274. See, e.g., Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (invalidating a conviction in
mayor’s court, because the mayor faced a “possible temptation” created by his “executive
responsibilities for village finances”); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531–32 (1927) (invalidating
conviction where mayor had the authority to sit as a judge to try those accused of violating a state
law prohibiting the possession of alcoholic beverages. Inherent in this structure were two
potential conflicts. First, the mayor received a salary supplement for performing judicial duties
and, second, the funds for that compensation derived from the fines assessed in a case); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (an administrative board composed of optometrists had a
pecuniary interest of “sufficient substance” so that it could not preside over a hearing against
competing optometrists).
275. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hosps., No. A07CA267
(W.D. Tex. 2007). At one major Houston hospital, in at least seven cases in which treatment was
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questions about saving money.” 276 Patients without insurance or those covered
by Medicaid are more likely to be perceived as receiving futile treatment. 277
Even TADA’s staunchest supporters concede: “I can’t promise you there’s not
some rogue hospital or committee out there.” 278 Indeed, there have been
specific allegations of corruption. 279
For example, Kalilah Roberson-Reese underwent a cesarean section at
Memorial Hermann Hospital in Houston, but amniotic fluid began to leak into
her lungs, forcing providers to put her on a ventilator. 280 Later, her tracheal
tube fell out and she went without oxygen long enough that she sustained
serious brain damage. 281 Within days, the hospital initiated the TADA dispute
resolution procedures, but the review committee was conflicted. The patient
had exhausted her Medicaid benefits and it appeared that the hospital was
trying to “bury mistakes” and avoid exposure both to liability and to
uncompensated treatment. 282
Another case from the same hospital involved similar allegations. The
family of Sabrina Martin alleged that “Memorial Hermann and the doctors and
nurses working on the case” utilized the TADA process because they “wanted

discontinued the patient was not covered by private or public insurance but was “self-pay.”
Castriotta, supra note 122.
276. Truog, supra note 173, at 990.
277. Thanh H. Neville et al., Differences Between Attendings’ and Fellows’ Perceptions of
Futile Treatment in the Intensive Care Unit at One Academic Health Center: Implications for
Training, 90 ACAD. MED. 324, 327 (2015).
278. Selby, supra note 225.
279. See, e.g, Order of Abatement, Dunn v. Methodist Hosp., No. 2015-69681 at 1 (Harris
Cty. Dist. Ct. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015); see also Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order, Davis v.
Memorial Hermann Hosp., No. 2009-07079 at 2–6 (Harris Cty. Dist. Ct. Tex. Feb 4, 2009); Mimi
Swartz, Not What the Doctor Ordered, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at 86, 94 (describing a case in
which CIGNA pressured the HEC chair to stop expensive treatment for end-stage AIDS patient
James D. Bland); Estate of Bland v. CIGNA Health Plan of Tex., No. 93-052630 (Harris Cty.
Dist. Ct. Tex. 1995).
280. Todd Ackerman, Texas Law at Hub of Life Support Issue, HOUS. CHRON. (July 8, 2006,
5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Texas-law-at-hub-of-life-supportissue-1887343.php.
281. Id.
282. Id.; see also In re Guardianship of Roberson-Reese, No. 365099-401, ¶ 28 (Harris Cty.
Prob. Ct. Tex. July 6, 2006) (“Ms. Roberson-Reese is an unemployed Medicaid patient with no
means of support . . . . Respondents accordingly have a financial incentive to give her bed to a
private insurance patient.”); id. ¶ 25 (“[Q]uestions exist about the quality of medical care
provided . . . . At the very least, there is an appearance of a conflict of interest that should
preclude the ethics committee . . . from making a decision that will end her life before an
independent investigation is made.”).
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Sabrina to die to bury the evidence of malpractice and limit the potential
damages in court.” 283
To address the review committee’s lack of neutrality, some have proposed
mandating certain minimum composition requirements. For example, some
proposals require that the review committee include “significant membership
from outside the hospital.” 284 One Australian court recommended that since
such a hospital review committee should have “independence . . . from the
treating doctors . . . it would probably need to have interstate members.” 285
Other specific membership composition solutions include making at least
one-quarter of the committee non-hospital staff, or mandating the inclusion of
members from disability and aging advocacy organizations. More radically,
hospitals could use an entirely independent and external oversight committee
otherwise unconnected to the hospital. 286 The key goal is to “balance between
embeddedness and detachment.” 287
B.

TADA Lacks Appellate Review

In addition to a neutral decision maker, the U.S. Supreme Court has also
held that procedural due process requires “meaningful appellate review.” 288
Review is deemed “meaningful” if it prevents the arbitrary deprivation of life
or liberty. 289 If a court or state agency could review the decision of the hospital
review committee, such review could largely “cure” the neutrality problem. 290

283. Chris Vogel, Doctors vs. Parents: Who Decides Right to Life?, HOUS. PRESS (Apr. 30,
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.houstonpress.com/2008-05-01/news/doctors-vs-parents-who-de
cides-right-to-life/.
284. Smith et al., supra note 172, at 1274.
285. Inquest into the death of Paulo Melo [2008] NTMC 080, 1, 34 (Austl.).
286. Diane Coleman, Disability Rights Leadership Institute on Bioethics (April 2014),
http://dredf.org/drlib/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/06/DRLIB-Withholding-of-Treatment.ppt.
Some Texas hospitals have responded to bias charges by appointing disability advocates to their
HECs. See Suzanne Shepherd, Dir. of Legal Svcs., Seton Fam. of Hosps., Hearing before the
Texas House of Representatives Committee on State Affairs (Apr. 14, 2009), http://tlchouse.gra
nicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=25&clip_id=4306.
287. Magelssen et al., supra note 267, at 681. Cf. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Unbefriended and
Unrepresented: Better Medical Decision Making for Incapacitated Patients Without Healthcare
Surrogates, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
288. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 489–90
(1984); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 58 (1984); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335–36
(1976); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
289. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 489–90.
290. Bosslet et al., supra note 28, at 1325 (“[T]he legitimacy of decisions that arise from a
purely procedural conflict-resolution process hinges on adherence to principles of fair process,
including legitimacy and freedom from conflict of interest, which some have argued cannot be
guaranteed given concerns about variable expertise within institutions and financial or relational
conflicts of interest . . . .”).
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But TADA has a real accountability problem. It denies substantive judicial
or agency review, making the hospital committee the forum of last resort. 291 A
court may only grant a definite extension of time, and it may do even that only
when there is a preponderance of evidence that a transfer will be
accomplished. 292 This means that TADA gives hospitals near-absolute
(unreviewable) power over when to terminate treatment. 293
Some have suggested that courts can review hospital committee decisions
under TADA. 294 But the dominant position is that substantive judicial review
is not available. 295 “TADA immunizes all denials of LSMT under its review
process, whether they are entirely arbitrary, negligent, reckless, or made with
malice and the intent of harming or killing the patient.” 296
This is the better reading for two reasons. First, the legislative purpose and
intent was to provide the legal certainty and finality that the Houston protocol

291. Truog, supra note 61, at 2 (“[T]he ethics committee is acting, under Texas law, as a
surrogate judge and jury . . . .”). Texas ethics committees can take justice into their own hands.
While we may be prepared to trust Batman, we are not ready for vigilantes like those depicted in
Taxi Driver or Death Wish.
292. See supra Section IV.C.7.
293. Painter, supra note 164, at 21.
294. Mayo, supra note 72, at 1010; Anne L. Flamm, The Texas “Futility” Procedure: No
Such Thing as a Fairy-Tale Ending, LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHICS J., Spring 2004, at 4, 4 (families
“can challenge a provider’s adherence to Section 166.046, or more generally, the reasonableness
of actions taken”).
295. See, e.g., Todd Ackerman, Judge Denies Request to Keep Man on Life Support, HOUS.
CHRON. (Mar 10, 2005, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Judgedenies-request-to-keep-man-on-life-support-1953649.php (the trial court denied an extension,
because the judge believed her duty was “to follow the law”); In re Nikolouzos, 179 S.W.3d 581,
582 (Tex. App. 2005) (Jenning, J., concurring) (“It is well-settled law that appellate courts have
jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders ‘only if a statute explicitly
provides appellate jurisdiction.’”) (citing Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 325, 352–53 (Tex. 1998));
Halevy & McGuire, supra note 67, at 38, 39 (“The statute explicitly limits the ability of the courts
to intervene in such cases.”); Lightfoot, supra note 55, at 854; Politics and Reality, supra note 66,
at 146; Earle’s Response Brief to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition; Application for Temporary
Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction, Gonzales v. Seton Family of
Hosps. et al., No. 86427 at 2 (Travis Cty. Prob. Ct. Tex. May 3, 2007); O’Callaghan, supra note
174, at 545 (“The statute’s use of the term ‘only’ limits the review of the court to a consideration
of whether alternative caregivers will likely be found and appears to foreclose a review of the
substantive decision to withdraw [life-sustaining treatment] . . . . [T]he statute appears to deprive
the patient of any other recourse to the courts beyond this limited time-extension procedure.”);
Cynthia S. Marietta, The Debate Over the Fate of the Texas “Futile-Care” Law: It Is Time for
Compromise 3, http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2007/(CM)TXFutileCare.pdf;
Truog, supra note 66, at 968 (“Under TADA the family has no options for appealing the decision
of the ethics committee.”).
296. Anne L. Flamm, Is the Baby in the Bathwater? A Defining Moment for the Texas
Advance Directives Act Review Process for Medical Futility Judgments, 18 HEALTH MATRIX
229, 232 (2008).
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lacked. 297 If the review committee’s decision could be reviewed, then the
process would likely become so protracted that virtually all conflicts would
become moot (by the patient’s death) before a decision on the merits. 298
Second, this interpretation is well supported in formal executive, judicial,
and legislative branch interpretations. Look first at the executive branch. When
the TADA first went to Governor Bush in 1997, he vetoed the bill because it
“eliminate[d] the objective negligence standard for reviewing whether a
physician properly discontinued the use of [LSMT] and replace[d] it with a
subjective ‘good faith’ standard.” 299
This reading is confirmed by interpretation by the judicial branch. In one
of the rare cases in which a case was litigated, the court refused to reach the
substantive question of whether LSMT was appropriate. It found submitted
medical evidence “irrelevant” since the “hospital’s ethics committee ha[d]
determined the care [was] inappropriate.” 300
Finally, consistent with executive and judicial branch interpretations of
TADA, the state legislature has also confirmed that the role for courts is a
narrow one. “The court considers whether another provider who will honor the
patient’s directive is likely to be found; it does not address the issue of whether
the decision to withdraw life support is valid.” 301
I am arguing for (some) judicial review of TADA review committee
decisions. External oversight is essential, but that does not mean the
appropriateness of LSMT should be determined by courts instead of hospital
review committees. 302 There is broad consensus that courts lack the requisite

297. Zerwas, supra note 102, at 177–79.
298. Id. at 179 (this was key to ending “the lingering fear of legal ramifications”).
299. Governor’s Proclamation, supra note 118; see also H. COMM. ON PUB. HEALTH, TEX.
HOUSE OF REPS., INTERIM REPORT 2006 33–34 (Nov. 15, 2006) (referencing Governor Bush’s
veto proclamation of the first TADA).
300. Nikolouzos v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. App. 2005).
301. H. COMM. ON PUB. HEALTH, supra note 299, at 35.
302. See generally Celia Kitzinger & Jenny Kitzinger, Court Applications for Withdrawal of
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration from Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State: Family
Experiences, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 11 (2016) (describing how due process entails significant costs
for all involved). Cf. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110–11 (1977) (“The
worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due
process will be meticulously observed.”). On the other hand, judicial review does work for
medical futility conflicts in Ontario and in the UK. See generally Bosslet et al., supra note 4. See
also Stewart, supra note 255, at 158 (noting a response time of Australian courts in two cases of
ten days and eight days). Judicial review is also working as a stop-gap measure for medical aid in
dying in Canada. See generally Mark Handelman, Assisted Death: The Risks and Benefits of
Tribunal Approval, 36 HEALTH L. CAN. 138 (2016). Some have also argued that “rapid review”
could work for life-sustaining treatment allocation decisions in crisis situations. MD. ATT’Y GEN.,
PUB. NO. 100OAG160, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS – STATE’S AUTHORITY TO
RATION VENTILATORS DURING PANDEMIC – PHYSICIAN IMMUNITY 184–85 (2015).
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expertise and responsiveness necessary to engage in de novo review of these
medical treatment decisions. 303 We should not replace or supplant the hospital
review committee. But, we need some mechanism of review and
accountability.
We must strike a balance between too much and too little review. On the
one hand, TADA now provides appellate review that is too little. On the other
hand, a non-deferential and more detailed review would be too much. We must
aim for a middle ground. Fortunately, we can look to (and borrow) wellestablished rules used in judicial review of agency actions. One particularly
relevant model is the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986. 304
When hospitals review their physicians in a manner consistent with the
same procedural due process principles described here, they have immunity
from civil money damages. So, if a hospital, with adequate notice and hearing
procedures, took action that adversely impacted a physician’s clinical
privileges or membership in a professional society, that physician would have
no monetary claim against the hospital. A court reviewing the hospital’s
actions would determine only if the hospital followed fair procedures and
whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence. If so, the court would
not reach the merits of the underlying matter. 305 Fixing TADA would simply
entail hospitals giving patients the same procedural due process protections
that they give physicians.
C. TADA Affords Inadequate Notice
In addition to having a neutral decision maker and appellate review,
another “elementary and fundamental requirement of due process” is notice. 306
Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections.” 307 Notice must “reasonably . . . convey [this]

303. See generally MEISEL ET AL., supra note 6 §§ 3.011, 3.19A, 3.23A, 3.25. In some recent
brain death cases the patient remained in the ICU for months due to preliminary injunctions and
stays. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Hailu, 361 P.3d 524, 525 (Nev. 2015). The same often
happens in futility conflicts. Sweiss v. Alberta Health Servs., 2009 ABQB 691 ¶¶ 28, 51–53
(Can.) (“There is no intention that a trial of the action will follow. Rather, the injunction is
generally sought to preserve the status quo in the interim”). See also generally Golubchuk v.
Salvation Army Grace Hosp., 2008 MBQB 49 (Can.). Indeed, the slowness of judicial processes
relative to medical treatment issues grounds the exception to mootness doctrine. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 796 n. 4 (9th
Cir. 1996).
304. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–52 (2012).
305. See generally Gabaldoni v. Washington County Hosp. Ass’n, 250 F.3d 255 (4th Cir.
2001).
306. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
307. Id.
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information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance.” 308 In short, the surrogate must have an “opportunity to
acquaint himself with the facts . . . of the case.” 309
But the mere forty-eight hours afforded by TADA does not allow the
surrogate enough time: (1) to obtain the medical records, (2) to consult with an
expert, and (3) to meaningfully prepare for the review committee meeting. 310
Federal courts have held that even substantially more notice was inadequate in
situations with far less at stake. 311
As a significant amount of legislative activity between 2007 and 2015
demonstrates, the short notice periods in TADA have been a central focus of
reformers. 312 “Civil libertarians and patient rights advocates argue that [TADA
fails to] provide[] sufficient time for the complicated and technical
requirements that are thrust onto the patient and family.” 313 Those who
represent patients report that the forty-eight hour period is “extremely
difficult.” 314 Even key authors of TADA support giving surrogates more
notice. 315
In one case that challenged the validity of TADA under federal law, the
court appointed a guardian ad litem for the patient. That guardian, Stephen
Jody Helman, submitted a fifty-page trial brief to the court observing that
TADA “is by no means perfect and could certainly be improved to make it
fairer and less burdensome to patients and their representatives.” 316 Mr.
Helman pointed specifically to the “short notice period.” 317

308. Id.
309. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932) (quoting Commonwealth v. O’Keefe, 298
Pa. 169, 173 (Pa. 1979)); see also Hicks v. Kentucky Unemp’t. Ins. Comm’n, 390 S.W.3d 167,
169 (Ky. App. 2013).
310. Bob Deuell, Respecting Every Life, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 2, 2007, 6:42 AM)
(noting that “families are thrust into a frenzied web of dismay”) (subsequently removed from
website and on file with author).
311. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (more than seven days may be
required before termination of welfare benefits); Walker v. United States, 744 F.2d 67, 70 (10th
Cir. 1984) (more than five days required before termination of public employment).
312. S.B. 439, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.B. 3474, 2007 Legis., 80th Sess. (Tex.
2007); S.B. 303, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013).
313. Painter, supra note 164, at 22.
314. Mary Ann Roser, At Life’s End, It’s Kin v. Doctors, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 8,
2006, at A01.
315. Mayo, supra note 72, at 1016.
316. Guardian Ad Litem’s Trial Brief on Legal Issues at 35, Gonzales v. Daughters of Charity
Health Servs. of Austin, No. 86,427 (Travis County Probate Court Tex. Mar. 6, 2007).
317. Id. at 35 n.17. Virginia gives surrogates fourteen instead of ten days. VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-2990 (LexisNexis 2016).
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To be sure, the notice period in TADA is only a minimum. In practice,
hospitals may exceed the statutory notice requirements. 318 For example, one
study suggests that the average notice given to a surrogate prior to a review
committee meeting was 7.9 days. 319 On the other hand, nothing in TADA
requires more than the forty-eight hour “floor.” Some hospitals offer no more.
Indeed, hospitals sometimes provide notice on a Friday afternoon for a
Monday morning review committee meeting. 320
D. TADA Fails to Assure a Meaningful Statement of Decision
We have now examined how TADA fails to satisfy three key elements of
procedural due process: (1) neutral decision maker, (2) appellate review, and
(3) notice. While perhaps not quite in the same hierarchy as these three,
another core element of procedural due process recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court is a “written statement” of decision. 321
This requirement to set out all the relevant facts and evidence serves
several purposes. First, it helps assure that a factual basis supports the

318. Chris Tomlinson, Right-To-Life Groups Split on End-of-Life Decision, HOUS. CHRON.
(Mar. 10, 2013) (reporting that by the time the review committee met, the patient had been in the
hospital an average of forty-seven days and almost six days elapsed between when the doctor
wanted to withdraw treatment and when the ethics committee met); Craig Myers, Section 166.046
of the Texas Futile Care Law: Supplying Health Care Providers a Procedural Framework
Regarding a Difficult Decision, HEALTH INDUSTRY ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2006 (depublished report)
(on file with author) (recommending that hospitals “consider providing for a more lengthy period
of time”); Andy Hogue, Hughes Bill Tackles End of Life Dilemmas, DALL. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2009),
http://www.dallasblog.com/200904201004656/dallas-blog/hughes-bill-tackles-end-of-life-dilem
mas.html (reporting that Seton Healthcare “has voluntarily changed policies” to go “well beyond
the minimum [ten] days”); Texas Act Formalizes Ethics Committee Role in Disputes, ACH
MEDIA (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/128665-texas-act-formalizes-ethicscommittee-role-in-disputes?trendmd-shared=1 (“[O]ne or more informal consults usually occur
before the formal consultation, even though they’re not required.”); Mayo, supra note 72, at
1015.
319. Email from Lance Lunsford, Vice President for Advocacy Communications, Texas
Hospital Association (May 21, 2014, 12:22 PM) (on file with author) (noting the following for
2010: Length of stay: one day; advance notice given to family/surrogate prior to ethics committee
meeting: four days; patient passed away during ten-day period. In 2009, the process was initiated
two times at two systems. Length of stay: thirty-five days; advance notice given to
family/surrogate prior to ethics committee meeting: sixteen days).
320. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 24, Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hosps, No. A07CA267SS
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2007); see also Petitioner’s Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment,
Temporary Restraining Order, and Motion to Extend Time at 5, Tex. Right to Life v. Memorial
Hermann Healthcare System, No. 365099-401 (Harris Cty. Prob. Ct. Tex. July 6, 2006)
[hereinafter Tex. Right to Life Original Petition] (alleging that the mother of Kalilah RobersonReese was informed on Friday, June 23, 2006 about an ethics committee meeting on Monday,
June 26, 2006).
321. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
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deprivation (or dispossession) of life, liberty, or property. 322 Second, it enables
the affected individual to understand the grounds for the deprivation. 323 Third,
it provides a record upon which to prepare for appeal. By enabling an appellate
tribunal to review the review committee’s reasons, a written statement protects
against arbitrary and capricious deprivations.
Unfortunately, TADA places no requirements on the extent of the
explanation provided. While some hospitals provide detailed explanations, 324
others do not. In one case, the hospital used a preprinted, single-page form
titled “Decision of the Committee for the Determination of Inappropriate/Futile
Treatment.” 325 The form includes no field or space for an explanation of why
the review committee judged interventions to be inappropriate. And, as the
form was used in at least several cases, no reasons or explanations were
provided. 326 In another case, the family alleged that they did not know who
made the decision or “what the specific grounds were for or against.” 327
Requiring a meaningful statement of decision would improve the TADA
dispute resolution process. Hospital review committees “like judges, will give
more careful consideration to the problem if they are required to state not only
the end result of their inquiry, but the process by which they reached it.” 328
Requiring a more complete written decision “sharpen[s] the decision makers’
internal thought processes.” 329 Judge Frank Coffin observes: “A remarkably

322. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 614 (1985).
323. Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1975). Indeed, the basis supporting the
proposed action should also be stated in the notice. Holliday v. Fields, 275 S.W. 642, 646 (Ky.
1925); Moffit v. Austin, 600 F. Supp. 295, 297–98 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
324. See, e.g., Affidavit of Catarina Gonzales at Ex. B, Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hosps.,
No. 1:07-cv-00267-SS (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2007) (the exhibit itself covers four single-spaced
pages); id. at Ex. D (covering six single-spaced pages).
325. Tex. Right to Life Original Petition, supra note 320, at Ex. A.
326. Id.; see also Ex. B to Petitioner, Davis v. Memorial Hermann Healthcare System, No.
2009-07079 (Harris Cty. Dist. Ct. Tex. Feb. 4, 2009) (showing that the form used by the review
committee did not have a space for an explanation and additionally did not state an explanation);
Robert L. Painter, Painter Law Firm, Introduction to the Texas Advance Directives Act,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 18, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEuIUaYbaw4.
327. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Hous. Methodist Hosp. Second Motion to Dismiss
at 2, Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., No. 2015-69681 (Harris Cty. Dist. Ct. Tex. May 6, 2016)
[hereinafter Response in Opposition]. Indeed, the ethics committee letter offers no reasons.
Chapter 74 Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Defendant’s Previous Motion to Dismiss at
Ex. A, Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., No. 2015-69681 (Harris Cty. Dist. Ct. Tx. May 6, 2016).
328. United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199 (1964).
329. Douglas E. Abrams, But “Will It Write”? How Writing Sharpens Decision-Making,
PRECEDENT, Spring 2009, at 61, 62. United Kingdom courts often include balance sheets
summarizing benefits and disadvantages from treatment. See, e.g., Cent. Manchester Univ.
Hosps. NHS Found. Trust v. A, [2015] EWHC (Fam) 2828 [15] (Eng.).
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effective device for detecting fissures in accuracy and logic is the reduction of
the results of one’s thought processes.” 330
Moreover, written statements of decision can increase trust between
families and providers. Written statements show families that the committee
seriously considered their arguments and facilitates judicial review. Families
are more likely to accept the result if they perceive the process as legitimate.
And even beyond the index case, this will help preserve trust in health care
more broadly. 331
So, hospital review committees should provide the surrogate not only with
the result of their decision making but also with their evidence and reasons
supporting those decisions. But exactly what content requirements should
apply to these statements of decision? What should review committees
include? That brings us to the next due process concern.
E.

TADA Fails to Provide Criteria to Guide Committee Review

Closely related to TADA’s failure to assure a meaningful statement of
decision is its failure to provide any criteria to guide the review committee.
The Supreme Court has warned about vague statutes that fail to provide
explicit standards for those who apply them. Such statutes increase the risk that
the decision maker will resolve the case “on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” 332
The Supreme Court recognized an analogous due process problem in the
capital punishment context. In 1972, the Court suspended all capital

330. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH 57 (1980) (“Somehow, a decision mulled over in one’s head or talked about
in conference looks different when dressed up in written words and sent out into sunlight . . . .
The act of writing tells us what was wrong with the act of thinking.”).
331. See generally Emily A. Largent, Health Care Organizations and the Power of
Procedure, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2016, at 51 (considering procedure as a way of changing the
decision-making process); Frederic Romain & Andrew Courtwright, Can I Trust Them to Do
Everything? The Role of Distrust in Ethics Committee Consultations for Conflict Over LifeSustaining Treatment Among Afro-Caribbean Patients, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 582 (2016)
(identifying ways that distrust can manifest itself in ethic committee consultations).
332. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). We would not want an
“architecture committee” of firefighters to decide which buildings were worth saving and which
would be left to burn. Testimony of Burke Balch, Tex. H. Comm. of Pub. Health 1:58.50 (Aug. 9,
2006), http://tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=23&clip_id=7187. Cf. MD. ATT’Y
GEN., supra note 302, at 183 (arguing there is less risk of error when the criteria are clear and
objective, and there is more risk of error where the criteria are complicated and allow discretion).
See also generally Thaddeus M. Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A
Response to Joel Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121 (2005) (explaining the dangers of
masking illegitimate reasons under the cloak of legitimate reasons). The history of the medical
futility debate is replete with declarations of “futility” without sufficient reflection or explanation
of how or why any particular intervention is inappropriate for any particular patient.
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punishment in the United States. Its concern was not the practice itself. The
problem was not “in principle,” but it was in application. 333 The penalty was
“wantonly and freakishly imposed” because jury discretion was not guided or
limited. 334 The Court upheld the practice in 1976 because, by then, the states
had specified factors for juries. 335
The risk of arbitrariness and bias is especially high with TADA. Not only
does TADA have no oversight, monitoring, or accountability, but it also has no
consistency or standardization. 336 One recent lawsuit alleges that hospitals
have “absolute authority and unfettered discretion to terminate life-sustaining
treatment of any patient.” 337 Without any guidepost anchors or criteria, there
may be significant variability not only in when but also in how hospitals
invoke TADA. Enormous variability has already been well-documented across
U.S. intensive care units. 338 Moreover, this variability is expressly presumed
by TADA’s transfer requirement.
The statute neither “contain[s] [nor] suggest[s] any ascertainable standard
for determining the propriety of continuing [LSMT].” 339 This creates three

333. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 387 (1972).
334. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
335. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (“While the jury is permitted to consider
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory
aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury’s discretion is
channeled.”).
336. Testimony of Colleen Horton on Texas S.B. 439, Tex. H. of Reps. Comm. on Pub.
Health 211:10 (2007), http://tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=23&clip_id=71
87.
337. Response in Opposition, supra note 327, at 7.
338. See, e.g., Dominic J. Wilkinson & Robert D. Truog, The Luck of the Draw: PhysicianRelated Variability in End-of-Life Decision-Making in Intensive Care, 39 INTENSIVE CARE MED.
1128, 1131 (2013); Megan E. Romano et al., Mandatory Ethics Consultation Policy, 84 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 581 (2009); Thomas Fassier & Elie Azoulay, Conflicts and Communication Gaps
in the Intensive Care Unit, 16 CURRENT OPS. IN CRITICAL CARE 654 (2010); Lawrence A. Ho et
al., Comparing Clinician Ratings of the Quality of Palliative Care in the Intensive Care Unit, 35
CRITICAL CARE MED. 975 (2011); Arino Yaguchi et al., International Differences in End-of-Life
Attitudes in the Intensive Care Unit, 165 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1970 (2005). This variability is
driven by clinicians’ personal values, religion, and culture. See generally A. Garland & A.F.
Connors, Physicians’ Influence over Decisions to Forego Life Support, 10 J. PALLIATIVE MED.
1298 (2007); Charles L. Sprung et al., The Importance of Religious Affiliation and Culture on
End-of-life Decisions in European Intensive Care Units, 33 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1732 (2007);
Fathima Paruk et al., The Durban World Congress Ethics Round Table Conference Report: III.
Withdrawing Mechanical Ventilation–The Approach Should Be Individualized, 29 J. CRITICAL
CARE 902 (2014); H.H. Bülow et al., Are Religion and Religiosity Important to End-of-Life
Decisions and Patient Autonomy in the ICU? The Ethicatt Study, 38 INTENSIVE CARE MED.1126
(2012).
339. Affidavit of Catarina Gonzales, supra note 324, at 12; see also Maureen Kwiecinski, To
Be or Not to Be, Should Doctors Decide? Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Futility Policies,
7 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 313, 349 (2006); O’Callaghan, supra note 174, at 529 (“[N]otably
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problems. First, it means that the decisions of review committees may not be as
informed or reasoned as necessary. Second, the lack of guiding standards
means that a single hospital review committee may disparately treat similarly
situated patients. Third, it means that review committees at different hospitals
may be deciding similar cases differently.
Now, the reader may ask how TADA could possibly include substantive
criteria, when its very genesis lies in the inability of clinicians and
philosophers to identify any such criteria. Recall the general shift in the 1990s
from substantive definitions of “futility” to process-based approaches. 340
I have two responses. First, even if we cannot identify a test or algorithm
for determining which treatment is inappropriate, we can still identify relevant
and irrelevant factors. 341 We may not be able to specify sufficient reasons but
we can identify “bad” reasons. For example, illegitimate bases for refusing
treatment (such as the patient’s race) could be specifically excluded. 342
Second, while a universal definition of “futility” has proven elusive,
specific futile scenarios have garnered widespread support. For example, many
clinicians deem LSMT inappropriate: (1) when the burdens of treatment
significantly outweigh the benefits, (2) when treatment can never achieve the
patient’s goals, (3) when death is imminent, (4) when the patient “will never be
able to survive outside of an ICU,” and (5) when the patient is permanently

absent from the statute are any objective standards . . . .”); id. at 530 (“fails to set forth any
standard of ‘futile’”); id. at 543 (“not clear what the committee is expected to review”); id. at
564–66, 589–96; David M. Zientek, The Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999: An Exercise in
Futility, 17 HEC F. 245, 251 (2005) (“[TADA] gives no guidance as to when it is legitimate to
override the patient’s or surrogate’s wishes.”); Heitman & Gremillion, supra note 111 (“[TADA]
offers no standards of evidence by which to judge appropriateness.”).
340. Heitman & Gremillion, supra note 111, at 88–89.
341. Ben White et al., What Does “Futility” Mean? An Empirical Study of Doctors’
Perceptions, 204 MED. J. AUSTL. 318.e1, 318.e3 (2016) (measuring conceptual consistency in
definitions); M. Cardona-Morrell et al., Non-Beneficial Treatments in Hospital at the End of Life:
A Systematic Review on Extent of the Problem, 28 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 456,
459 (2016) (collecting examples of what clinicians identify as non-beneficial treatment).
342. See, e.g., H.B. 1539, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013); S.B. 1163, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess.
at 2 (Tex. 2015); H.B. 4100, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. at 14 (Tex. 2015).
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unconscious. 343 On the other hand, clinicians are more prepared to find
treatment appropriate if it is based on religion. 344
Admittedly, these five principles cannot be automatically or mechanically
applied in an algorithmic fashion. But neither should they be wholly
disregarded. These and similar definitions, rules, and paradigm cases can
productively inform and guide review committee deliberation and analysis.
F.

Other Due Process Concerns

While the above five elements of procedural due process are those that
present the most serious problems with TADA, they are not the only ones. 345
The quality of TADA review committee decisions is also materially and
adversely affected by: (1) the review committee’s lack of diverse membership,
(2) the review committee’s lack of training and competence, (3) the absence of
standard meeting and hearing procedures, and (4) the absence of a requirement
assuring the surrogate’s participation.
First, TADA omits several key issues relating to the review committee. 346
In stark contrast to federal regulations governing institutional review boards in
the research context, TADA includes no details or guidelines concerning how a
hospital composes its ethics committee. 347 TADA is silent as to: (1) the overall
number of committee members required, (2) the inclusion of members from
different professional disciplines, (3) the inclusion of lay or community

343. Huynh et al., supra note 40, at 1890; Neville et al., supra note 277, at 326. See also
generally Lindy Willmott et al., Reasons Doctors Provide Futile Treatment at the End of Life: A
Qualitative Study, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 496 (2016) (describing various factors for when futile care
is often provided at the end of life). Similarly, many statutes and court opinions articulate factors
that should be considered in determining whether life-sustaining treatment is in a patient’s best
interests. See, e.g., L.A. COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT RULE 7.5(h), https://www.lacourt.org/court
rules/CurrentCourtRulesPDF/Chap7.pdf.
344. Derek D. Ayeh et al., U.S. Physicians’ Opinions About Accommodating Religiously
Based Requests for Continued Life Sustaining Treatment, 51 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 971,
977 (2016).
345. The right to representation by counsel is another essential element of a fair hearing.
Thompson v. Bd. of Educ. of Henderson Cnty., 838 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Ky. 1992). But TADA also
does not assure the surrogate a right to have legal counsel present.
346. Statement of Michael Rieger, General Council of Seaton Family of Hosps., Hearing on
H. Committee Substitute 3474 Before the Tex. H. Comm. on Public Health 7:28 (2007), http://tlc
house.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=24&clip_id=2724; TEX. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note
97 (“The composition varies among hospitals . . . some . . . have only physician members.”);
Heitman & Gremillion, supra note 111, at 95 (“The open-ended definition of the review
committee is a serious concern.”); Fine & Mayo, supra note 56, at 744 (“[M]any on the task
force . . . believed this was suboptimal . . . .”).
347. Contrast Painter, supra note 164, at 21, with 45 C.F.R. § 46.107.
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members, and (4) the inclusion of members with different gender, race, and
disability status. 348
Second, TADA is silent as to the training or qualifications of the review
committee members. 349 Many bioethics leaders have expressed “growing
concern about [the practice of] health care ethics consultation and how it is
practiced.” 350 The field is moving toward certification based on educational
achievements and examination performance. Here, where the review
committee acts as a decision maker, not as a mere advisor or consultant, the
need to assure that it has the right knowledge and skills is even higher.
Third, TADA fails to define the “rules by which an ethics committee must
operate.” 351 TADA hospital review committees have neither quorum
requirements nor a system of review. 352 They do not report whether their
decisions are unanimous or by a slim majority or whether dissent existed. 353
Some surrogates have even reported that they were stopped in the hall of the
hospital, only to later discover that the brief and informal hallway encounter
constituted the review committee meeting. 354
Fourth, the “right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential
and fundamental requirement” of due process. 355 But TADA assures only the

348. Id.; Zientek, supra note 339, at 253–54; Selby, supra note 225; Bassel, supra note 6, at
511 (“Ethics [c]ommittee [b]ias [c]ontaminates [f]utility [d]ispute [r]esolution.”); Roser, supra
note 314 (observing that only three of twelve futility cases were Caucasian). I have separately
assessed bias issues with ethics committees. See generally Pope, supra note 261; Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 10.
349. Texas Act Formalizes Ethics Committee Role in Disputes, supra note 318 (task force
could not reach consensus on “skill sets or educational requirements”).
350. Ellen Fox, Developing a Certifying Examination for Health Care Ethics Consultants:
Bioethicists Need Help, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2014, at 1, 1.
351. Politics and Reality, supra note 66, at 146.
352. HENRY M. ROBERT, III ET AL., ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED VLVII,
334–36 (Perseus Publishing, 10th ed. 2000) (commonly adopted rules of order for parliamentary
authority suggest that having a quorum requirement and system of review are important
considerations for due process concerns).
353. H. Comm. on Pub. Health, (2007), http://tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=24&clip_id=2724 Statement by Richard Mullin, General Council of Seaton Family of
Hosps., on the House Committee Substitute 3474; id. at 1:47 (statement by Greg Hooser,
Chairman of the Texas Advanced Directives Coalition, on House Committee Substitute 3474)
(“[E]thics committees come in all shapes and sizes.”); id. at 2:46 (statement by Colleen Horton,
University of Texas Center for Disabilities Studies, on House Committee Substitute 3474)
(testifying about the lack of HEC oversight, monitoring, accountability, consistency, and
standardization).
354. Robert Painter, Attorney, Statement on Senate Bill 439 Before the Senate Comm. on
Health and Human Serv. 4:21, http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/commit/c610/c610_
80.htm; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 161.031(b) (2015) (defining the term “medical
committee” to include “a committee appointed ad hoc”).
355. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
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surrogate’s right to “attend” the meeting. 356 It does not assure the surrogate a
right to ask questions of the attending physician or any other witness. 357
Admittedly, many Texas hospitals voluntarily allow confrontation and crossexamination. 358 But there is no provision in TADA that guarantees the right. 359
VII. CONCLUSION
Striking the right balance between efficiency and fairness is difficult.
These two goals are in tension. Dispute resolution procedures that better
achieve one goal entail a tradeoff that correspondingly disrespects the other.
On the one hand, the cost of less process is undermining deeply held principles
of fundamental fairness. 360 On the other hand, the cost of more process is
maintenance of the status quo, the continued administration of potentially nonbeneficial treatment. 361
TADA is a commendable attempt to “steer a course between the Scylla of
judicial review and the Charybdis of unfettered, unexamined physician
discretion.” 362 But TADA places too much weight on efficiency at the cost of
fairness. Moreover, while it may have been politically expedient, striking the
balance in this way was unnecessary as a matter of cost, ethics, law, or
manageability.
The recalibration that I have defended in this article would not change the
fundamental power of hospital review committees to authorize the withholding
or withdrawal of inappropriate LSMT. Instead, the changes would be minor,
affecting only: (1) who is on the review committee, (2) how the committee
conducts its meeting and makes its decision, and (3) the extent to which that

356. O’Callaghan, supra note 174, at 543.
357. Verified Complaint at 11, Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hosps., No. 07-cv-00267-SS
(W.D. Tex. April 4, 2007); Adam Black, Texas Right to Life, Statement on Senate Bill 439 Before
the Senate Comm. on Health and Human Servs. 4:30, http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/
Senate/commit/c610/c610_80.htm; O’Callaghan, supra note 174, at 543. Some notable proposed
amendments to TADA aimed to better protect the family’s right of confrontation and crossexamination. See, e.g., S.B. 303, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. § 7 (Tex. 2013).
358. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Catarina Gonzales at 12, Gonzales v. Seton Family of Hosps.,
No. 07-cv-00267-SS (W.D. Tex. April 4, 2007) (“You will be given the opportunity to ask
questions . . . and to provide input into the committee’s decision making process.”); Hogue, supra
note 318 (reporting that Seton Healthcare “has voluntarily changed policies to allow attorneys to
be present”); Painter, supra note 164, at 22; Myers, supra note 318 (“[I]t may be prudent to
specify that the patient/decision maker has the right to actually participate and be heard . . . .”);
Kwiecinski, supra note 339, at 350.
359. Participation not only contributes to accuracy of the review committee decision but also
creates the “appearance of justice.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666
(2d ed. 1988).
360. Truog, supra note 173, at 1001.
361. Stewart, supra note 255, at 158.
362. Mayo, supra note 72, at 1010.
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decision can be reviewed. If TADA is used as infrequently as recent reports
indicate, the costs of more procedural due process would be circumscribed and
determinate. 363 This is a small price to pay to properly respect notions of due
process, fundamental fairness, and fair procedure.
* * * * *

363. Death Panel, supra note 10, at 41–43. Smaller rural hospitals may have a more difficult
time mustering the resources to comply with more elaborate due process. Testimony of Tom
Mayo, Texas H. Comm. on Pub. Health (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.house.state.tx.us/videoaudio/committee-broadcasts/79/.
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APPENDIX: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TADA
Many readers will want to know more about the legislative history of
TADA. How did such a statute get enacted in a state like Texas? How was it
signed by a governor like George W. Bush? How did such a statute survive for
over seventeen years? Did the legislature try to fix some of the procedural due
process problems identified by Professor Pope? To answer these and related
questions, I am providing this appendix. It describes the legislative history of
TADA in a descriptive, non-normative fashion.
I. INTRODUCTION
When TADA was first enacted in 1999, it had the broad support of
hospital, medical, pro-life, and civil liberty groups. The legislation passed as
the result of a consensus among a wide spectrum of stakeholders. 364 But within
just a few years of enactment, that consensus had crumbled. Strong
disagreements developed over how health care providers were implementing
TADA’s dispute resolution provisions. 365 TADA has proven very controversial
and has been the subject of significant legislative activity.
Pushed largely by disability and right-to-life advocates, the Texas
legislature has considered numerous bills directed at amending TADA’s
dispute resolution provision. These bills have been of three main types: (1)
those directed at strengthening its due process protections, (2) those directed at
completely eliminating the ability of clinicians to stop life-sustaining treatment
without consent, and (3) those directed at narrowing the scope of the statute.
The Texas Legislature meets every other year. 366 More than twenty-five
bills have been introduced in the last eight legislative sessions (2003, 2005,
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015). But only two amendments were enacted.
One was in 2003; the other was in 2015.
2003 Enacted Amendments
In 2003, Senator Jane Nelson proposed S.B. 1320. It was enacted and went
into effect immediately on June 20, 2003. 367 S.B. 1320 amended TADA in
three important ways. First, S.B. 1320 extended the dispute resolution
procedures to minors as well as adults. 368 Second, it added the section
expediting the review process for patients who have already been the subject of
the review. 369 Third, S.B. 1320 added TADA’s three written disclosures: (1) It
364. Ramshaw, supra note 54.
365. Painter, supra note 164.
366. Kate Galbraith, Texas Stands Against Tide in Retaining Biennial Legislature, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2010, § A, at 19A.
367. S.B. 1320, 2003 Leg., 78th Sess. (Tex. 2003).
368. Mayo, supra note 75, at 1010.
369. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(e-1).
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specified the written language explaining a patient’s right to transfer, 370 (2) it
mandated creation of the registry for health care providers and referral groups
willing to accept or assist in transfers, 371 and (3) it specified the optional
written description of the review process. 372
2005 Proposed Amendments
In 2005, no bills were offered to amend TADA. But Representative Bryan
Hughes offered two amendments on the House floor to an unrelated bill, S.B.
1188: Amendments 26 and 28. 373 Hughes later proved to be one of the central
legislators involved in trying to amend TADA over the next ten years. Hughes
withdrew Amendment 26, but Amendment 28 moved forward. 374 Amendment
28 would have required the state to pay the costs associated with transfers of
Medicaid patients. 375 And it would have required that life-sustaining treatment
continue until a transfer occurred. Ultimately, Hughes’ amendment was
removed in a conference committee.
While the legislature made no changes to TADA in 2005, that year would
still turn out to be a pivotal one in the statute’s history. By spring, several
medical futility cases had received significant attention from major newspapers
and broadcast media. 376 This brought TADA squarely into the public spotlight
for the first time.
In apparent response to this intense media coverage, the Speaker of the
Texas House of Representatives included TADA in his October 2005 interim
charges for House Committees. Specifically, the Speaker directed the Texas
House Committee on Public Health to “[r]eview issues relating to [TADA] and
assess if patients and/or their loved ones have a sufficient opportunity to obtain
transfer to an alternate facility.” 377
On August 9, 2006, the House Committee on Public Health held a lengthy
hearing in which seventy-nine witnesses offered testimony or registered
opinions. 378 By this time, TADA had garnered even wider public attention. 379

370. Id. § 166.052.
371. Id. § 166.053.
372. Id. § 166.046(b)(1).
373. TADA was indirectly the subject of one 2005 amendment. See S.B. 1188, Amend. 26,
2005 Leg., 79th Sess. (Tex. 2005); see also S.B. 1188, Amend. 28, 2005 Leg., 79th Sess. (Tex.
2005).
374. Id. at Amend. 26.
375. Id. at Amend. 28.
376. Zerwas, supra note 102, at 182;
377. Tom Craddick, Interim Study Charges Texas House of Representatives 79th Legislature
at 30 (Oct. 19, 2005), http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/members/dist24/assets/pdf/79thin
terimcharges.pdf.
378. See generally TEX. H. COMM. ON PUB. HEALTH, 79th Sess. Comm. Broadcast Arch.
(Aug. 9, 2006), http://tlchouse.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=23&clip_id=7187.
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On November 15, 2006, the Committee delivered a sixty-five page report to
the Speaker of the House. 380 It recommended that “the Texas Legislature
consider revisions to Chapter 166.046.” 381
2007 Proposed Amendments
When the legislature next convened in January 2007, it followed the House
Committee’s recommendations. Legislators introduced eight different bills to
address the concerns that had been voiced during the August 2006 hearing.
Ultimately, none of these bills were passed.
Perhaps most notable among these bills was S.B. 439, the Patient and
Family Treatment Choices Rights Act. It was introduced by Senator Bob
Deuell, 382 a physician who would be a major player in the multi-year saga to
amend TADA. S.B. 439 would have made TADA more patient-friendly and
fair. First, it required an advisory ethics consultation before the formal dispute
resolution process. 383 Second, it required hospitals to provide families with a
patient liaison to guide them through the process. 384 Third, S.B. 439 increased
the notice period from two to seven days. 385 Fourth, it increased the transfer
waiting period from ten to twenty-one days. 386 Fifth, it required hospitals to
quickly provide medical records and to permit families to bring five or more
persons for support to the review committee meeting. 387 Finally, S.B. 439
would have required hospitals to file reports on their use of TADA and the
outcomes in those cases. 388 The Senate passed the bill, but time ran out before
S.B. 439 reached the House floor.
Representative Garnet Coleman’s House Bill (H.B.) 3690 offered many of
the same protections and safeguards as S.B. 439. Other bills, like
Representative Jodie Laubenberg’s H.B. 3970, were more narrowly focused.
Representative Tan Parker’s H.B. 1440 addressed how transfers were
accomplished. Hospitals could convey medical facts but not opinions about the
appropriateness of life-sustaining treatment. 389 Parker’s H.B. 3180 would

379. See, e.g., Howard Witt, Who Gets to Make Decisions on End of Life?, CHI. TRIBUNE
(Sept. 17, 2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-09-17/news/0609170386_1_patient-lifesupport-11th-hour-scramble.
380. H. COMM. ON PUB. HEALTH, supra note 299, at 32–40.
381. Id. at 40.
382. S.B. 439, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. at 1 (Tex. 2007).
383. Id. at 16.
384. Id. at 17.
385. Id. at 16.
386. Id. at 15.
387. S.B. 439 at 6.
388. Id. at 19.
389. H.B. 1440, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. at 1 (Tex. 2007).
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extend the transfer waiting period from ten days to ninety days. 390
Representative Dianne Delisi’s H.B. 3474 would: (1) extend the ten-day
transfer period to eleven business days, (2) offer a patient liaison, (3) require
an “advisory consultation,” and (4) assure quick provision of medical
records. 391
Perhaps the most radical bill of 2007 was H.B. 1094, offered by Hughes.
This bill would eliminate the ten-day transfer period and instead require that
the current treating facility continue treatment until the patient is transferred. 392
And if the patient could not be transferred, then the current facility would have
to continue treatment indefinitely. H.B. 1094 also exempted artificial nutrition
and hydration from the treatment covered by TADA 393 (a type of amendment
that was later enacted in 2015).
2009 Proposed Amendments
When the Texas Legislature next convened in 2009, legislators again
offered bills to amend TADA. Legislators introduced two bills: H.B. 2964 and
H.B. 3325. Ultimately, neither bill was enacted.
Coleman’s H.B. 2964 was the more moderate bill. It purported: (1) to
exempt artificial nutrition and hydration from the sorts of treatments that can
be unilaterally refused, (2) to appoint a patient liaison to assist the patient or
surrogate through the dispute resolution process, and (3) to extend the transfer
period from ten to fourteen days. 394
In contrast, Hughes’ H.B. 3325 proposed more dramatic changes. H.B.
3325 was directed, like Hughes’ 2005 and 2007 amendments, at narrowing
hospital authority under TADA. H.B. 3325 proposed: (1) eliminating the
transfer time period altogether, thereby effectively requiring treatment until
transfer, and (2) authorizing no-fee judicial review of the physician’s or ethics
committee’s decision. 395
2011 Proposed Amendments
As during both the 2007 and 2009 legislative sessions, legislators again
proposed and debated TADA amendment bills in the 2011 session. 396 As in
prior sessions, none were enacted into law. 397

390. H.B. 3180, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. at 3 (Tex. 2007).
391. H.B. 3474, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. at 2–3, 5, 10 (Tex. 2007).
392. S.B. 1094, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. at 1 (Tex. 2007).
393. Id. at 2.
394. H.B. 2964, 2009 Leg., 81st Sess. at 3–5 (Tex. 2009).
395. H.B. 3325, 2009 Leg., 81st Sess. at 2–4 (Tex. 2009).
396. TEX. LEG. ONLINE, Bill Stages, http://www.legis.state.tx.us/billlookup/BillStages.aspx?
LegSess=82R&Bill=HB3520 (last visited October 6, 2016).
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For the fourth legislative session in a row, Hughes introduced a bill to
eviscerate hospital authority under TADA. H.B. 3520 proposed eliminating the
transfer time period, effectively requiring treatment until transfer. 398 Hughes’
bill also exempted artificial nutrition and hydration from the life-sustaining
treatment covered by TADA. 399
Particularly regrettable, in 2011, was the failure to enact an amendment to
an unrelated bill that would have created the Texas Institute of Healthcare
Quality and Efficiency. The amendment would have mandated data collection
on TADA usage. 400 It would have required the Health and Human Services
Commission to promulgate regulations requiring hospitals to report detailed
statistical and demographic information concerning use of TADA. 401
2013 Proposed Amendments
Efforts to amend TADA heated up in 2013. Legislators introduced six
TADA amendment bills in the 2013 legislative session. Again, all these bills
failed. But all this activity prompted a wide public discussion both in Texas
and beyond.
By far, the most significant of the 2013 bills was S.B. 303. 402 This bill, by
Deuell, reintroduced many of the safeguards and protections that Deuell
included in S.B. 439 back in 2007. 403 S.B. 303 included a reporting
requirement. 404 It required an “advisory ethics consultation” before the formal

397. Chuck Lindell, Sensitive Topic of Futile Medical Care Faces Long Road in Legislature,
AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN (May 8, 2011, 7:12 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/stateregional-govt-politics/sensitive-topic-of-futile-medical-care-faces-long-/nRZrK/; Emily
Ramshaw, Texas End-of-Life Bills Appear Dead, TEX. TRIBUNE (May 23, 2011, 5:49 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2011/05/23/texas-end-of-life-bills-appear-dead/; Joe Tone, How
Long Should Texas Docs Treat Untreatable Patients? The Debate That Won’t Go Away, DALL.
OBSERVER (July 8, 2011, 11:05 AM), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/how-long-shouldtexas-docs-treat-untreatable-patients-the-debate-that-wont-go-away-7107579.
398. H.B. 3520, 2011 Leg., 82d Sess. at 6 (Tex. 2011).
399. Id. at 5.
400. H.R. Journal, 2011 Leg., 82d Sess. at 5136 (Tex. 2011).
401. S.B. 8, 2011 Leg., 82d Sess. (Tex. 2011); H.R. Journal, supra note 400, at 5136–37. A
proposed amendment for an interim study also failed. S.B. 8 at 5138; id. at 5138.
402. Representative King’s H.B. 1444, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013) was a mirror
companion to S.B. 303, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013).
403. Dr. John M. Haas, President of The National Bioethics Center, commented that
“[s]ignificant safeguards were developed in this proposed legislation to correct existing statutes
and to protect informed consent, without forcing the health care provider to initiate or continue
futile and harmful procedures.” CATHOLICS FOR ADVANCE DIRECTIVES REFORM, Bishops
Articulate Church Teaching on End-of-Life Care Reform in Austin, TEX. CATHOLIC CONF.
http://www.txcatholic-advance-directives.org/#!austin-october-2014-conference-/c58f (last
accessed Oct. 1, 2016).
404. S.B. 303 at 27.
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review committee meeting. 405 It increased the amount of notice before
committee review (from two to seven days). 406 And it increased the amount of
time in the transfer waiting period (from ten to twenty-one days). 407
Furthermore, with respect to the hospital review committee meeting itself,
S.B. 303 offered a special liaison to guide families through the process. It
ensured that family members could be accompanied by up to five persons
during the review committee meeting, and that the surrogate could not just
attend but also participate. 408 It also guaranteed access to medical records in
advance of the meeting. 409
S.B. 303 even provided some substantive standards by which to judge
treatment inappropriateness. For example, life-sustaining treatment is
inappropriate if it: (1) “threaten[s] the patient’s life,” (2) “seriously
exacerbate[s] other major medical problems,” (3) causes “pain or discomfort
not outweighed by the benefit of the . . . treatment,” or (4) is “medically
ineffective in prolonging the patient’s life.” 410
While Deuell tried to improve TADA, Hughes again tried to kill it. Hughes
offered H.B. 1464. 411 Like his bills in prior sessions, this bill would exempt
artificial nutrition and hydration. 412 And it would eliminate the transfer waiting
period, instead requiring treatment indefinitely until transfer. 413
This year, Hughes was joined by TADA opponents Representative
Stephanie Klick and Representative Charles Perry. H.B. 1889 would exempt
artificial nutrition and hydration from the scope of TADA. 414 H.B. 1539 would
disallow certain reasons for refusing treatment. 415 Specifically, the clinician
could not refuse because she places “lesser value” on “extending the life of an
elderly, disabled, or terminally ill patient.” 416 Nor could a clinician disagree
with a surrogate’s decision to place “greater weight” on “extending the

405. Id. at 14–15.
406. Id. at 21.
407. Id. at 23.
408. Id. at 21.
409. S.B. 303 at 22.
410. Id. at 13. While Senate Bill 303 was supported by a number of pro-life organizations, it
was opposed by Texas Right to Life. Todd Ackerman, Legislature Again Tries Its Hand at
“Futile-Care” Reform, HOUS. CHRON. (May. 12, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.
com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Legislature-again-tries-its-hand-at-futile-care-45097
41.php; Tomlinson, supra note 318.
411. H.B. 1464, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. at 1 (Tex. 2013).
412. Id.
413. Id. at 2.
414. H.B. 1889, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013).
415. Senate Bill 675, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013) was the mirror companion of H.B.
1539, 2013 Leg., 83d Sess. (Tex. 2013).
416. H.B. 1539 at 2.
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patient’s life above the risk of disability.” 417 Of course, that is precisely what
TADA permits (and was intended to permit) a clinician to do.
2015 Proposed and Enacted Amendments
As the 2015 legislative session in Texas began, it was clear that legislators
would again try to tackle TADA. The Texas Medical Association (TMA)
observed: “In anticipation of another round of debates over end-of-life care,
TMA’s workgroup dedicated to the issue will work to protect physicians’
ability to do what’s best for patients in their final days.” 418 Indeed, defending
TADA is part of TMA’s strategic roadmap for state advocacy initiatives. 419
Other organizations similarly expressed interest in protecting, improving, or
destroying TADA.
Since no proposed changes were made in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, or 2013,
this was “round six.” Apparently, the sixth time was the charm. For the first
time since 2003, Texas actually amended the “futility” provisions in TADA.
Both the Texas House and Senate passed H.B. 3074, which had been
introduced by Representative Drew Springer. In June, the bill was signed by
the Governor.
Effective September 1, 2015, this legislation exempted “artificially
administered nutrition and hydration” (AANH) from the scope of lifesustaining treatment subject to the dispute resolution procedures. 420
Particularly since the intense and prolonged international media attention on
the legal dispute concerning Terri Schiavo, many state legislatures have tried
to treat AANH differently from other forms of life-sustaining medical
treatment. 421
Today, clinicians can continue using TADA to stop life-sustaining
medications, mechanical breathing machines, and kidney dialysis treatment.
But clinicians may not use TADA to stop AANH unless it would either not
417. Id.
418. Amy Lynn Sorrel, Capitol Decisions Ahead, TEX. MED., Jan. 2015, at 26, 31.
419. TEX. MED. ASS’N HEALTHY VISION 2020 18 (2d ed. 2014).
Legislation has been introduced over the past four legislative sessions that would instead
require indefinite treatment with no provision for the physician exercising ethics or moral
judgment. TMA has opposed these proposals because they would prolong unnecessary—
and often painful or even torturous—care that cannot prevent but can only prolong death.
They would also require physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals to provide
medically inappropriate care, even if that care violates medical ethics or the standard of
care. They also would set a dangerous precedent for the legislature to mandate the
provision of physician services and treatments that may be medically inappropriate,
outside the standard of care, or unethical.
Id.
420. H.B. 3074, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015).
421. Josh Perry, Biopolitics at the Bedside: Proxy Wars and Feeding Tubes, 28 J. LEG. MED.
171, 182–87 (2007).
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work at all or would directly harm the patient. The statute unpacks these
exceptions, allowing clinicians to unilaterally withhold or withdraw AANH if
it would: “(1) hasten the patient’s death; (2) seriously exacerbate[] [other
major] medical problems not outweighed by the benefit of the provision of the
treatment; (3) result in substantial irremediable physical pain, [suffering, or
discomfort] not outweighed by the benefit of the provision of the treatment; or
(4) be medically ineffective.” 422 Importantly, clinicians may not stop AANH
under TADA because of the patient’s permanent unconsciousness or quality of
life.
In addition to the AANH limitation, H.B. 3074 also clarified that TADA
“does not authorize withholding or withdrawing pain management medication,
medical procedures necessary to provide comfort, or any other health care
provided to alleviate a patient’s pain.” 423 Finally, H.B. 3074 added a
requirement that the hospital provide the surrogate with the portion of the
patient’s medical record related to the treatment received in the facility during
the current admission or during the preceding thirty calendar days. 424
While only H.B. 3074 was enacted, the legislature considered five other
bills in 2015. 425 First, consistent with his track record for over a decade,
Hughes introduced H.B. 2984. Like many of Hughes’ prior bills, this one
would require treatment until transfer.
With an agenda similar to Hughes, Senator Kelly Hancock introduced S.B.
1163. Described as pro-life and defending core conservative values, Hancock
crafted a bill that was not designed to improve the fairness of TADA (like
Deuell’s bills over the past sessions). Instead, S.B. 1163 was designed to
wholly eliminate TADA’s dispute resolution provisions. Representative James
Frank introduced H.B. 3414, the mirror companion to S.B. 1163.
Instead of requiring treatment until transfer like Hughes’ bills, S.B. 1163
would have added a new section (Texas Health and Safety Code Section
166.0455) that specified two reasons on which a review committee may not
base a determination of medical inappropriateness. 426 Specifically, the bill

422. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(e) (2015).
423. H.B. 3074, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015).
424. Id.
425. Two other bills would have affected TADA only by changing the names of referenced
state agencies. H.B. 550, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015); S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex.
2015).
426. S.B. 1163, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. at 2 (Tex. 2015). The bill applied not only to review
committees but also to health care professionals and health care facilities. Like review
committees, they too would be prohibited from using the specified reasons for overriding or
refusing to honor and comply with a patient’s advance directive or a health care or treatment
decision made by or on behalf of a patient that directs the provision of life-sustaining treatment.
Id.
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prohibited a review committee from determining LSMT to be inappropriate
under Section 166.046 based on either:
(1) the lesser value the physician or professional, facility, or committee places
on sustaining the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill patient compared
to the value of sustaining the life of a patient who is younger, not disabled, or
not terminally ill; or
(2) a disagreement between the physician or professional, facility, or
committee and the patient, or the person authorized to make a treatment
decision for the patient under Section 166.039, over the greater weight the
patient or person places on sustaining the patient’s life than the risk of
427
disability.

S.B. 1163 also specified (in a new a-1 subsection of 166.046) that the only
bases on which a review committee may determine life-sustaining treatment to
be inappropriate are: (1) physiological futility and (2) when “providing the
treatment to the patient would clearly create a substantially greater risk of
causing or hastening the death of the patient than would withholding or
withdrawing the treatment.” 428
Coleman’s H.B. 4100 would, like S.B. 1163 and H.B. 3414, narrow the
scope of the review committee. Under this bill, a review committee could deny
requested treatment only if it would: “(1) threaten the patient’s life; (2)
seriously exacerbate other major medical problems not outweighed by the
benefit of the provision of the treatment; or (3) result in substantial
irremediable physical pain or discomfort not outweighed by the benefit of the
provision of the treatment.” 429
H.B. 4100 would have also prohibited the review committee from
determining medical appropriateness on the basis of “permanent disability,
advanced age, gender, religious or cultural differences, or financial
circumstances.” 430 The bill extended the notice period from forty-eight hours
to seven days and the transfer period from ten to twenty-one days. 431 It
required a patient liaison, quick access to the medical record, and an advisory
consultation. 432 Finally, like S.B. 1163 and H.B. 3414, H.B. 4100 would
exempt clinically assisted artificial nutrition and hydration from the scope of
life-sustaining treatment that can be refused. 433
427. Id. This language is similar to that in an Oklahoma statute used to prohibit clinicians
from overriding or refusing treatment requests. See generally Kendra Norman, Live and Let Die:
The Consequences of Oklahoma’s Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act, 68 OKLA L. REV. 585
(2016).
428. S.B. 1163 at 3.
429. H.B. 4100, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015).
430. Id.
431. Id. at 9–10.
432. Id. at 11.
433. Id. at 8.
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Finally, Representative Patricia Harless introduced H.B. 2351. This bill
would have required review committees to adopt two types of policies: (1) “to
prevent financial and health care professional conflicts of interest” and (2) “to
prohibit consideration of a patient’s permanent physical or mental disability
during a review . . . unless the disability is relevant in determining whether a
medical or surgical intervention is medically appropriate.” 434
2017 and Beyond
The battle over TADA has been largely fought between those who want to
improve the fairness of TADA and those who are opposed to the very concept
that hospitals and physicians should be authorized to stop life-sustaining
treatment without consent. The former have been thwarted in their efforts to
improve TADA, because to improve it is also to preserve it. 435 As the 2017
legislative session draws near, familiar debates will again echo through the
halls of the Texas Capitol. 436

434. H.B. 2351, 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015).
435. Since 2007, Senator Deuell has proposed and shepherded legislation that would make
TADA fairer. But since his bills would preserve the core adjudicatory authority of hospital
committees, he has been charged with turning his back on life and on disabled patients, earning
him the nickname “Dr. Death.” Terri Schiavo’s Brother Plea to Texas House Against Senator
Deuell’s SB 303, TEAPARTY911 (May 5, 2013), http://www.teaparty911.com/blog/terri-schiavosbrother-plea-to-texas-house-against-senator-deuells-sb-303/. In 2014, Deuell lost the
Republication nomination for his Senate seat in the 2015 session. Ray Leszcynski, Bob Hall
Edges Out Bob Deuell in State Senate Fight to the Finish, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 28,
2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-politics/2014/05/28/bob-hall-edges-out-bob-deuell
-in-state-senate-fight-to-the-finish; Michael Hashimoto, As Bob Deuell Feared, Low Turnout Cost
Him in Senate Runoff, DALL. MORNING NEWS BLOG (May 28, 2014, 1:23 PM), http://dallas
morningviewsblog.dallasnews.com/2014/05/as-bob-deuell-feared-low-turnout-cost-him-in-sen
ate-runoff.html. Moreover, as Deuell defended himself from negative attack ads, he was sued for
interference with contract. Deuell v. Texas Right to Life Committee, No. 01-15-00617-CV (Tex.
App. Sept. 15, 2016).
436. TEX. RIGHT TO LIFE, On Human Rights Day We Stand for Life (Dec. 10, 2016),
https://www.texasrighttolife.com/on-human-rights-day-we-stand-for-life/ (declaring intent to
work with legislators to amend TADA); Pro-Life Legislative Priorities for Texas Will Be Topic of
Next Grassroots America Meeting, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH (Nov. 26, 2016, 4:36 PM),
http://www.tylerpaper.com/TP-News+Local/258906/prolife-legislative-priorities-for-texas-willbe-topic-of-next-grassroots-america-meeting.

